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The Efficiency Defense Under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act
Timothy J. Muris*
Though seemingly affundamental issue throughout antitrust law, eiciency has
neverplayed much of a role in the analysis of mergers challenged under section 7 of
the Clayton Act. It appears that the reasons for the underplay given that potential
justyifcation arefour: That such a defense is incompatible with economic theory, that
the legislative history of section 7 reveals a congressional desire to forbid such a
defense, that the Supreme Court has in its section 7 opinions precluded such a de-
fense, and that the admissibility of.fciency evidence would unduly complicate trials.
Professor Muris categorically challenges each ofthose arguments and concludes that
an efficiencyjust[ fication should be, andis, available to defendants whose acquisitions
are challenged under the Clayton Act.
INTRODUCTION
THAT THE antitrust laws should promote efficiency would seem
beyond question.' Society benefits from lower costs, innova-
tion, and higher quality.2 Indeed, in speaking of the basic anti-
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I. Efficiency is so engrained in antitrust that any argument on the subject generally
concerns whether efficiency is the only relevant value. See, e.g., Antitrust Jurisprudence: A
Symposium on the Economic, Political and Social Goals ofAntitrust Policy, 125 U. PA. L.
REV. 1182 (1977).
2. For a discussion of the meaning of efficiency, see notes 14-19 & 175-86 infra and
accompanying text.
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trust statute, the Supreme Court has stated:
The Sherman Act . . . rests on the premise that the unre-
strained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best al-
location of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the
highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the
same time providing an environment conducive to the preser-
vation of our democratic, political and social institutions.
3
Mergers can increase efficiency. Horizontal mergers may pro-
vide the volume necessary to obtain the economies that result
from large size. Vertical mergers may increase efficiency where
the internal costs of operation are less than the costs of
nonintegrated firms using the market. Conglomerate mergers
may allow a more efficient management to acquire control of a
firm.4 Despite the efficiency-generating potential of mergers, the
enforcement agencies5 and many commentators6 contend that, in
3. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
4. These examples are not meant to be exhaustive. For a more detailed analysis of
the possible efficiencies resulting from mergers, see notes 173-211 infra and accompanying
text.
5. The Department of Justice guidelines for horizontal mergers state:
Economies. Unless there are exceptional circumstances, the Department will not
accept as a justification for an acquisition normally subject to challenge under its
horizontal merger standards the claim that the merger will produce economies
(i.e., improvements in efficiency) because, among other reasons, (i) the Depart-
ment's adherence to the standards will usually result in no challenge being made
to mergers of the kind most likely to involve companies operating significantly
below the size necessary to achieve significant economies of scale; (ii) where sub-
stantial economies are potentially available to a firm, they can normally be real-
ized through internal expansion; and (iii) there usually are severe difficulties in
accurately establishing the existence and magnitude of economies claimed for a
merger.
Department of Justice Press Release, Merger Guidelines (May 30, 1968), reprintedin [1978]
1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4510.
Concerning vertical mergers, the guidelines are somewhat more generous toward effi-
ciency. A vertical merger will probably be undisturbed when it "clearly" appears to result
in significant economies "of production or distribution unrelated to advertising or other
promotional economies." Id. Otherwise, however, economies are not regarded as a justifi-
cation. Id. Reducing the cost of transacting, a potentially important efficiency incentive
for vertical mergers, see notes 161-62 infra and accompanying text, is ignored.
For conglomerate mergers, the guidelines express an unwillingness to consider effi-
ciency when substantial market power (ie., the ability to decrease output and increase
price) may exist. Id. Thus, at best, the Justice Department's merger guidelines cautiously
recognize efficiency as a relevant consideration in mergers that increase market power. If
the merger does not increase market power, it is legal regardless of efficiency. Conse-
quently, the only general consideration under the guidelines for determining legality is the
effect of the merger on market power.
The other enforcement agency, the Federal Trade Commission, appears to possess an
even harsher attitude. In a recent study of FTC opinions in horizontal merger cases be-
tween 1970 and 1977, Professor Liebeler found that when efficiency was mentioned, it was
a factor against the merger. See Liebeler, Antitrust and the New FTC, in K. CLARKSON &
T. MURIs, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION SINCE 1970: GOVERNMENT REGULATION
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proceedings under section 7 of the Clayton Act,7 defendants
should be barred from asserting efficiency as a legal justification
for a merger. Four arguments are frequently advanced to deny an
efficiency defense in challenged mergers:
1) If a merger increases market power, increased efficiency
will not outweigh the adverse impact of that power;8
2) Congress precluded efficiency as a justification for a
merger,
9
3) Supreme Court decisions, particularly Brown Shoe,10
Philadelphia National Bank,"' and Procter & Gamble,12 hold
that efficiency cannot justify, and may even be evidence
against, a merger,
4) Judges and attorneys face intractable hurdles in dealing
with an efficiency issue in the context of litigation. 13
This article examines these arguments, concluding that each is
unpersuasive and, moreover, that antitrust policy requires consid-
eration of efficiency. Part I shows that even a small increase in
efficiency will generally outweigh a relatively larger increase in
market power. Part II demonstrates that not only did Congress
not preclude an efficiency defense, but that legislative history ex-
plicitly indicates that efficiency should count for a merger's legal-
ity. Part III discusses the Supreme Court's failure thus far to
decide definitely whether efficiency is a defense. Finally, Part IV
concludes that, although consideration of efficiency will compli-
cate merger proceedings, the issue can be litigated meaningfully to
improve the quality of decisions made.
AND BUREAUCRATIC BEHAVIOR (unpublished, on file with the author). See generally Scan-
Ion, Policy Planning at the FTC: A Commissioner Who Really Believes In It, 6 ANTITRUST
L. & EcON. REV. 35, 37-47 (1973); 633 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) AA-1 (Oct.
9, 1973).
6. Commentators rejecting an efficiency justification include R. BORK, THE ANTI-
TRUST PARADOX 124-29 (1978); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 112 (1976); Bok, Section 7of
the Clayton Act and the Merging ofLaw and Economics, 74 HARv. L. REV. 226, 318-21(1960); Brodley, Potential Competition Mergers: A Structural Synthesis, 87 YALE L.J. 1,
83-85 (1977).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). Section 7 prohibits all acquisitions whose effect "may be
substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly." Id.
8. See notes 14-41 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 42-83 infra and accompanying text.
10. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). See notes 86-106 infra and
accompanying text.
11. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963). See notes 107-19
infra and accompanying text.
12. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967). See notes 120-38 infra and
accompanying text.
13. See notes 173-211 infra and accompanying text.
1980]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE L4W REVIEW [
I. THE EFFICIENCY-MARKET POWER TRADEOFF
It is frequently asserted that a firm's ability to decrease output
and raise prices, an ability often called market power, should be
the only relevant issue in merger cases.14 According to this view,
if a merger does not increase market power, it should be legal; if it
increases market power, it should be illegal regardless of the effi-
ciency gain. This argument is incorrect: Efficiency may justify
some mergers that increase market power. The following discus-
sion develops a model to define efficiency and related economic
concepts as they apply to analysis of a merger under section 7 and
to evaluate a merger that both increases efficiency (i e., lowers
costs) and increases market power (ie., raises price). Objections
and qualifications to this approach are also addressed.
A. Economic Meaning of the Section 7 Standard
Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits all mergers whose effect
"may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly." 5 Economically, the concepts of competition, monop-
oly, market power, and efficiency can be illustrated using Figure 1.
Assuming that D is the demand curve for an industry and AC, the
average cost of that industry's firms, any price above Pl-for ex-
ample P2-- is what economists call "allocatively inefficient" be-
cause consumers do not receive units of output (in this case all of
those between Q2 and QI) for which they would be willing to pay
at least the cost of production.' 6 Any merger that only reduces
output, and thus raises price, increases market power and accord-
ingly reduces allocative efficiency--or put in the terms of section
7, competition.' 7 Competition is at its greatest when output is in-
creased to the level where price and cost are equated.
Curve AC2 represents a second way to increase allocative effi-
ciency, namely lowering costs, the subject of our concern here.
Allocative efficiency is increased because lower costs allow pro-
14. See note 5 supra.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
16. A more formal analysis of Figure I would reveal that allocative efficiency is maxi-
mized when the difference between the area under the demand curve and the area under
the cost curve is at its greatest. This occurs when price equals cost.
17. Whether Congress and the Court concur that increases in allocative efficiency in-
crease competition will be discussed at notes 42-83 & notes 84-153 infra and accompany-
ing text.
384 Vol. 30:381
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duction of at least the same output as before, yet free resources to
produce other goods that consumers value. Thus the efficiency
defense, as that term as used in this article, refers to a cost-de-
crease. To avoid confusion, efficiency will refer to lower costs and
competition to the concept of allocative efficiency.
Figure 1
Cost -
Savings (G)
Loss (L)
Q1 Q
B. The Tradeoff Analysis
What if a merger reduces both cost and output, thus raising the
price? From the standpoint of competition, both a gain and loss
have occurred. Can we determine on balance which effect is likely
to dominate? Oliver Williamson has developed a method to an-
swer this question. 8 As an illustration of the model, let us return
18. Professor Williamson's method unfolded in three separate articles published over
the course of a decade. Williamson, Economies as an Antiftrust Defense: The Welfare Trade-
offs, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 18 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Williamson 1] (technical corrections
in this article were made in Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: Correction and
Reply, 58 AM. ECON. REv. 1372 (1969)); Williamson, Allocative Efficiency and the Limits of
Antitrust, 59 AM. ECON. REv. 105 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Williamson fl]; Williamson,
Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 699 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Williamson III]. The Williamson method is an application of what economists call
"partial equilibrium welfare" or "allocative efficiency" analysis. Id. at 708 n.27. The gains
1980]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW V
to Figure 1, and assume that prior to the merger there are only
two firms in the relevant market, acting competitively and having
identical costs. AC is the combined average premerger cost of
the two firms, while AC2 is the new cost. P, and Q, are the pre-
merger price and quantity, while P2 and Q2 are the postmerger
levels. Thus, the merger has both lowered costs and raised prices.
What are the net effects?
Most economists would conclude that the loss from increased
market power is the triangle, L, while the gain from increased effi-
ciency is the rectangle, G.I9 If G exceeds L, the merger produces a
net benefit, despite increased price, decreased output, and in-
creased profits to the firm. Only if L exceeds G is the net competi-
tive effect negative.2 ° Professor Williamson concludes that a small
gain in efficiency normally outweighs a relatively much larger in-
crease in market power. This follows in large part because the loss
to society is measured only in terms of decreased units of output,
while the gain is measured in terms of the entire output of the new
firm. Unless the price increase is enormous or a small price in-
crease triggers a large decrease in quantity demanded, the number
of units still produced will exceed the drop in output resulting
from an increase in market power. Thus, the gains are calculated
over more units than are the losses.
One can be more precise about the relative magnitudes of the
price increases and cost declines necessary for the merger to be
beneficial. Table 1 provides data based upon Williamson's
model.2 1
and losses under this analysis, which ignores distribution effects, are explained in the text
accompanying notes 16-17 supra.
Throughout this part of the paper, the emphasis is on the horizontal merger, which of
all mergers has the most potential for anticompetitive effect. Showing the benefits from an
efficiency-market power tradeoff in horizontal mergers will reveal the propriety of such a
tradeoff in other mergers.
19. Professor Posner disagrees that L represents the loss. See note 41 infra.
It is important to note that if cost reductions do not occur over all phases of production,
the calculus must be adjusted. For example, if distribution costs are reduced four percent
where distribution comprises only twenty-five percent of total costs, the appropriate figure
for the tradeoff model is one percent.
20. With competition, output will eventually expand to the intersection ofAC2 and D,
the demand curve. This is not relevant to the direct comparison of the premerger versus
postmerger situation. If competition were currently sufficient to lower market price to this
point, the market power effects of the merger could not occur. Competition would also
cause costs to drop, although whether by merger or internal expansion depends on the
relative costs of these two methods. See notes 31--41 infra and accompanying text.
21. The numbers in Table 1 are drawn from Liebeler, Market Power and Competitive
Superiority in Concentrated Industries, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1231, 1298 (1978) (Kasden,
[ ol. 30:381
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Table 1: Percentage cost reductions sufficient to offset
percentage price increases for selected values of elasticity
of demand.
Elasticity: 3 2 1
Price 1 .015 .01 .005 .002
Increase: 2 .060 .04 .020 .010
5 .381 .25 .123 .061
10 1.550 1.00 .484 .238
15 3.544 2.25 1.072 .523
20 6.400 4.00 1.878 .908
25 10.156 6.25 2.893 1.393
For example, if elasticity of demand for the industry (but not for
the firm22) is two, and the merger would raise price ten percent,
only a one percent decrease in cost will offset the price rise.
Again, with elasticity of two, if price rises by five percent, a one-
quarter of one percent drop in costs will offset the increase in mar-
ket power. Relying on empirical evidence that a reasonable upper
bound on elasticity is three, and that price increases rarely exceed
ten percent above the competitive level, Williamson concludes
that a merger "that promises nontrivial economies-say greater
Mathematical Appendix). Kasden's numbers are used instead of Williamson's because
Kasden recomputed Williamson's data "to take more accurate account of the form of the
demand curves." Id. at 1296.
It has been argued that if market power exists before the merger, then, to offset that
power, efficiencies need to be more significant than Williamson asserts. Jackson, The Con-
sideration of Economies in Merger Cases, 43 J. Bus. 439 (1970). This is correct as a matter
of mathematics, since the closer one starts to zero output, the larger the market loss (ie.,
triangle L in Figure 1) for any given percentage price rise. The argument is, however,
insensitive to economic analysis. If prices have already risen ten percent above the compet-
itive price, it does not necessarily follow that an increase of an additional ten percent is
readily accomplished. Firms will not raise prices an additional ten percent if that amount
is above the profit maximizing point, which it may be, depending upon the elasticity of
demand. Moreover, the firm's demand curve is influenced by other firms' supply responses
and the higher the initial price is above the competitive level, the more the threat of entry
limits further price increases.
22. Table 1 uses industry elasticity because that figure reveals the anticompetitive ef-
fect on an industry of a price increase resulting from a merger.
As the text indicates, empirical evidence suggests that price increases from mergers
rarely exceed ten percent, which in turn implies that the firm's elasticity of demand will
normally greatly exceed that of the industry. This follows even with mergers in concen-
trated industries because actual and potential competitors of the merged firm limit, al-
though not necessarily eliminate, the merged firm's ability to price noncompetitively.
Where this effect on the merged firm does not exist, for example where government regula-
tion bars new entry, price increases larger than those in Table 1 become more likely. For
the effect of such larger increases on the trial of a merger case, see note 188 infra and
accompanying text.
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than two percent-will generally yield a net allocative efficiency
gain."23 In other words, even if only a small drop in costs can be
shown, the presumption should be that the merger is beneficial. 4
C. Objections and Qual/cations
Two objections are frequently raised to Williamson's conclu-
sion.
1. Efficiency May Be Available to Only Some Firms Within the
Industry
Williamson illustrates his model with a merger of 100 percent
of the relevant market. Since mergers in fact involve less than 100
percent, is not Williamson's presumption in favor of mergers that
increase efficiency weakened, especially if the merger leads to a
price rise over all of industry output? Consider an example with
demand elasticity of two, a merger involving twenty-five percent
of the industry, and an industrywide ten percent price increase.
Costs must then drop by four percent, not one percent as shown in
Table 1, to offset the effects of the price increase.
Closer analysis, however, reveals at least three reasons why
small efficiency gains still justify mergers. First, even in this ex-
ample, a cost reduction of four percent would offset a price rise
two and one-half times its size. More important, it is unlikely that
a merger of two firms with only twenty-five percent of the market
could by itself cause a ten percent price increase.25 Since merger
cases rarely, if ever, involve the creation of so-called dominant
23. Williamson III, supra note 18, at 709 (where Williamson also justifies his assump-
tions). Based on the recomputed numbers, see note 21 supra, the 2% figure could actually
be lowered to around 1.5%.
The reader might ask why in Table 1 more elastic demand curves appear to yield
greater monopoly power than less elastic demand curves. Economic theory, of course,
teaches that monopoly power will cause greater losses where demand is inelastic. Rather
than contradicting economic theory, the table uses a different base of measurement. In-
stead of comparing a move from competition to monopoly, Williamson assumes a fixed,
identical price increase over all elasticities. Under these assumptions, the more elastic the
demand curve, the greater the decrease in output from a fixed price increase. Hence, more
elastic demand curves produce greater welfare losses.
24. Thrdughout the remainder of this article, "presumption in favor of mergers that
increase efficiency" or the "Williamson presumption" will be used to refer to this presump-
tion.
25. As in all litigated cases, the mergers discussed here involve two firms. Efficiency is
not discounted where a trend toward concentration exists because the trend is only relevant
when tacit or explicit collusion becomes a problem. Moreover, as Professor Bork argues,
such a trend is much more likely to be consistent with efficiency than with market power.
R. BORK, supra note 6, at 23 1.
[Vol. 30:381
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firms, 6 the competitive problem in mergers is the facilitation of
tacit or explicit price fixing. Since the number of firms is only one
of many factors that influence collusion, 7 and since mergers typi-
cally involve the elimination of only one firm, we cannot with cer-
tainty conclude that elimination of only one firm will lead to
collusion. Thus, even if it were certain that successful collusion
could lead to as large as a ten percent price increase, this figure
would have to be discounted to compensate for the uncertainty
over whether the merger will actually result in collusion. Even if
the maximum possible discounted price increase is as high as five
percent, 8 with industry elasticity of two, costs need decrease by
only one percent to offset the market power increase.2 9 Finally,
the price increase may not occur over the industry's entire output.
If only some firms in the industry are part of the collusion, the
average rise in industrywide prices would correspondingly be
less.3o
If the merger constitutes a dominant share of the industry, say
seventy-five percent, significant price increases may occur over
most of industry output. The cost savings, however, would then
also occur over a significant share of industry output. Thus, even
with elasticity as high as three, if price were to increase ten percent
industrywide, cost need only drop approximately two percent to
offset that increase.
2. Efficiency Obtainable Through Internal Growth
Since internal growth can increase efficiency, why not ignore
efficiency in merger cases, thereby avoiding the possibility of in-
creased market power?31 Preventing the merger would produce
26. As used here, a dominant firm is one that is able to reduce output to raise the
industry's average price for an appreciable period of time.
27. For an excellent discussion of the many factors besides concentration influencing
the ability to collude, see R. POSNER, supra note 6, at 39-77.
28. For the figure to be five percent, there would need to be a fifty percent chance that
the merger would lead to successful collusion raising the price to ten percent. See note 23
supra and accompanying text.
29. If there were only a few firms in the industry, then elimination of one would be
more important. Most industries, however, contain a larger number of firms.
30. Collusion could successfully exist over a limited period of time without involving
all members of an industry. Other firms would eventually increase output, but the delay
might still allow for benefits to accrue from the collusion. Moreover, even if all firms are
members of the cartel, some might cheat, and thus not actually be part of the collusion.
31. See 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST 106 (1978); W. BREIT & K. ELZINGA,
THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES 99-103 (1976); Bok, supra note 6, at 340; Department of Jus-
tice Press Release, Merger Guidelines, supra note 5.
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better results since the efficiency would then result without an in-
crease in market power. There are at least four reasons why the
possibility of internal growth does not rebut the Williamson pre-
sumption in favor of efficiency from merger.
First, internal expansion may increase costs relative to expan-
sion by merger. Internal growth may duplicate facilities, particu-
larly where demand is stagnant or declining. Duplication could
occur even in a growing market if the merger would result in some
specialized efficiency peculiar to the merging firms or if the mar-
ket is not growing quickly enough to sustain both existing industry
capacity and that added internally. Moreover, if firms in fact use
mergers to reduce costs, in many cases mergers will presumably be
a cheaper method of obtaining the economies than will internal
expansion.32 Merger may also be a faster and therefore preferable
method of obtaining efficiency. Forcing internal expansion would
therefore produce less efficiency.
Second, since cartels are unstable,3 3 their market power tends
to dissipate. Where demand is growing, making internal expan-
sion likely to occur more rapidly, market power is also likely to
decrease more quickly since entry is generally facilitated when de-
mand increases. 34 Thus, where reliance on internal growth to pro-
duce efficiency is most warranted, there is less reason to fear
market power. Dissipation could even make internal expansion
irrelevant. If the market power dissipates by the time that internal
growth would occur, internal growth is preferable to merger only
if the market power effects had outweighed the efficiency effects at
the time of the merger.35 The appropriate policy would then be to
ignore internal growth and compare efficiency and market power
as explained above. There is one reason why such dissipation can
frequently be expected. Cartels, whether explicitly or tacitly orga-
nized, are usually broken by increases in output, either from new
firms entering the industry or from industry members not part of,
or cheating on, the cartel. This new output requires planning and
implementation similar or identical to that needed for internal ex-
pansion. Indeed, to the extent that the new output comes from
32. This follows because profit-maximizing firms will choose the lower cost of two
alternative routes to the same end. But see note 36 infra.
33. See R. POSNER, supra note 6, at 50-52; F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 158-64 (1970).
34. See R. BORK, supra note 6, at 130.
35. This problem could be analyzed more formally by comparing the discounted val-
ues of L and G in Figure 1, with L appropriately adjusted for its decline and G for the
possibility for internal growth. See Williamson I, supra note 18, at 29.
[Vol. 30:381
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existing factories of firms already in the industry, dissipation of
market power will occur before internal expansion. 6
Third, in most mergers attacked today, the possibility that col-
lusion will be facilitated, although often real, appears to be
slight.37 When efficiency can be demonstrated, the possibility that
internal growth will produce greater benefits than mergers accord-
ingly decreases. When internal growth will result in the same effi-
ciencies only after the merger would have,3  banning the merger
would sacrifice gains for the relatively speculative costs of possible
increased market power.
Fourth, where demand is stable, concentration-and with it
the facilitation of collusion-increases just as much with internal
growth as with mergers. If merger is cheaper or faster in realizing
efficiency, it is preferable to internal expansion. Moreover, even
where demand is growing, internal expansion is not necessarily
without market power consequences.3 9
36. Evaluating the relevance of internal growth becomes more complicated when in-
creasing market power motivates the merger. For example, internal growth may be a
cheaper form of lowering costs than a merger, yet the merger may be preferred to increase
market power. See note 27 supra and accompanying text. Partly for this reason, internal
growth is sometimes relevant and its possibility could even rebut the Williamson presump-
tion. See note 40 infra and accompanying text.
37. To illustrate this proposition, consider fifteen recent decisions preventing horizon-
tal mergers. (The sample includes all substantive decisions of the Supreme Court and all
cases since 1975 where sufficient information of the type described below was available. A
list of these cases may be obtained from the author.) Even focusing only on concentration,
most of the mergers in these cases are not prime candidates for facilitating collusion. In
only six did postmerger, four-firm concentration exceed sixty percent; in only five did the
combined share of the merging firms exceed twenty percent; and in only three did the
smaller of the merging firms have a premerger share above ten percent (this last criterion is
a very rough proxy for whether the merger removed a significant competitor). Further,
only four satisfied the first two criteria, while only three met all three tests.
It might be suggested that if the possibility of facilitating collusion from such mergers is
not great, then the solution is not to search for efficiency, but simply to permit the mergers
regardless of lowered costs. Given the inability of economics to speak with precision as to
when collusion will occur, however, see, e.g., notes 203-04 infra, we cannot dismiss the
possibility that many mergers which occur in settings not prime candidates for collusion,
still facilitate collusion, albeit perhaps only in some small way. Assuming that litigation
costs are not overly burdensome, if these mergers produce no countervailing benefits, then
a safe response would be to ban them. The question of the appropriate policy toward these
mergers therefore becomes one of benefits such as lower costs. See also notes 206-11 infra
and accompanying text, discussing the practical significance of an efficiency defense.
38. Although mergers do not instantaneously lower costs, relative to internal expan-
sion, it is easy to envision the greater rapidity with which mergers can usually reduce costs.
For example, vertical mergers that lower transaction costs begin to have this effect when
exchanges with outsiders are no longer made, a step that can follow quickly upon merging.
In general, it probably takes longer to build new facilities than to utilize existing ones.
39. For example, some firms might enjoy a comparative advantage in internal growth
1980]
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This is not to say that the possibility of internal growth will
never be relevant to merger policy. In very large mergers where
riew entry will be slow, it will be crucial.4 0 Nevertheless, the four
factors discussed above indicate that the possibility of internal ex-
pansion does not, in most mergers, rebut the presumption in favor
of a merger resulting in nontrivial cost-savings."
and use this advantage to increase their relative market shares and, perhaps, concentration.
For a formal analysis of the market power effects of internal growth, see Williamson, Econ-
omies as an Antitrust Defense: Correction and Reply, supra note 18, at 1374-76.
40. Slow entry and a merger combining a large share of the industry create a situation
ripe for collusion or for dominant firm pricing, making internal expansion highly relevant.
Of course, to the extent that entry is slow because of stagnant demand, internal expansion
is unlikely. For this reason, and because it will increase concentration, it would then be
irrelevant. The rate of entry, however, is a function of more than merely the growth in
demahd. Other factors influence entry, including the scale of entry needed for efficient
operation and government regulation.
If the merger is vertical, the possibility of internal growth can be ignored, at least as to
foreclosure, the most commonly cited competitive problem of such mergers. Merger and
expansion yield an identical level of foreclosure.
41. Although not echoed by others, Professor Posner has made one other important
objection to Williamson's model. He argues that Williamson's analysis is incomplete since
"[tihe expected profits of the merger will generate an equivalent amount of costs as the
firms vie to make such mergers or, after they are made, to engross the profits generated by
the high postmerger price through service competition or whatever." Posner, The Social
Cost of Monoploly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 807, 821 (1975). Williamson argues
that the problem of an equivalent amount of costs exists "only under carefully delimited
conditions, which are not present in the merger-for-economies contexts." Williamson III,
supra note 18, at 723. In addition to Williamson's points, id. at 713-23, the major ones of
which are that normally functioning entry and the market for corporate control prevent the
problem, two other points undermine Posner's argument. First, in most mergers litigated
today, the possibility of increased market power is small. See note 37 supra. The less
prevalent market power is, the more likely efficiency considerations will prevail, and ac-
cordingly there is less of an incentive to waste resources. The competition that then occurs
for the benefits is largely efficient, not wasteful. Second, where facilitation of collusion is
the manner in which market power is increased, potential acquiring firms will usually not
need to expend large resources identifying the best potential partners since important firm-
specific attributes that facilitate collusion such as market share are already known. Fur-
ther, since all firms in the industry enjoy the benefits of collusion, the acquiring firm will
not face a costly bidding war when collusion is its goal.
Nevertheless, Posner's argument, although overstated, raises the importance of costs
other than those of decreased output for reducing the net benefits of mergers. In cases
where these costs are significant, they qualify the analysis. Fortunately, these other costs
will often be detectable. For example, as Williamson notes, the increased prices from mar-
ket power may cause firms from other regions or from other countries to ship goods to
consumers in the merged firm's market, causing inefficiency because the real cost in supply-
ing consumers has increased by the incremental transportation expense even if the effect of
the shipping is to constrain the market power of the merged firm. See Wlliamson III,
supra note 18, at 712-13 & 734-36.
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C. Summary
The foregoing analysis yields an important proposition for
evaluating mergers: where even small economies exist, a merger
can be presumed to be procompetitive. There are, however, three
objections to an efficiency justification unrelated to the theoretical
tradeoff between efficiency and market power. We turn next to
the first of these-that Congress precluded efficiency as a defense.
II. CONGRESS AND THE EFFICIENCY JUSTIFICATION
Despite the compatibility just demonstrated between economic
theory and an efficiency justification, the defense is unavailable if
Congress precluded its exercise or indicated that efficiency was to
count against a merger.42 Analysis of this question begins with a
brief chronology of the events leading to the 1950 amendment of
section 7 by the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act.43 The discus-
sion then addresses whether Congress' preoccupation with what it
perceived as a dangerous rise in concentration supports preclusion
of efficiency as a defense. The analysis then shifts to those aspects
of the legislative history directly discussing efficiency, and con-
cludes by evaluating indirect evidence of congressional intent re-
garding an efficiency justification.
A. Chronology44
Although some congressmen introduced merger bills during
the 1930's, the effort to amend section 7 of the Clayton Act began
in earnest in 1941 when Congress' Temporary National Economic
Committee (TNEC) issued its final report and recommenda-
tions.45 Fearing increased concentration and wanting to close the
42. For arguments that Congress intended to preclude certain mergers regardless of
economic considerations such as efficiency, see Bok, supra note 6, at 318; Pitofsky, The
Polilical Content ofAndirust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051, 1060-65 (1979); Fox, Book Review,
54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 446, 460 (1979); see also notes 88-106 infra and accompanying text.
As have the courts in mergers since 1950, we concentrate on the 1950 amendment,
which was a complete overhaul of the seldom used section 7 of the 1914 Act. Particularly
as to the meaning of the competitive impact standard, under which arguments concerning
an efficiency defense would fall, Congress was writing on a clean slate in 1950. See
Brodley, supra note 6, at 41-42 n. 161.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
44. This story is told in more detail elsewhere. See, e.g., Handler & Robinson, .4
Decade of Administration of the Celler-Ke/auver.4ntimerger Act, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 629,
652-74 (1961); Note, Section 7ofthe Clayton Act: A Legislative History, 52 COLUM. L. REv.
766 (1952).
45. S. Doc. No. 35, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) [hereinafter cited as TNEC Report].
As early as 1921, bills to amend section 7 were introduced. Note, supra note 44, at 766 n.3.
19801
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
loophole in original section 7 that permitted one corporation to
purchase the assets of another corporation regardless of competi-
tive effect, the TNEC called for significant changes. Its proposed
bill would have closed the asset loophole and given the Federal
Trade Commission authority to forbid acquisitions of an, as of
then, undetermined size unless the merging companies could
demonstrate "that the purpose and apparent effect of such consoli-
dation would be desirable."46 Desirability was to be determined
by findings on issues such as concentration and effect on competi-
tion.47 Thus, the proposed legislation required that certain merg-
ers receive prior approval.
Although the House Judiciary Committee endorsed prior ap-
proval in 1946,48 its bill died in the Rules Committee. Represen-
tative Kefauver introduced an identical bill in 1947, which, after
extensive hearings, was reintroduced without the prior approval
requirement. The modified proposal outlawed mergers where
"there is a reasonable probability that the effect of such acquisi-
tion may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly. '49 In 1949, Representative Celler introduced H.R.
2734, a bill very similar to the reintroduced Kefauver bill. The
House approved this bill in August 1949,50 and, after further hear-
In 1927, the Federal Trade Commission, already dissatisfied with judicial interpretation of
section 7, began its nearly annual call for amendment. Hearings on H. 2734 Before the
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 13, 20 (1950)
[hereinafter cited as H.R. 2734 Hearings]. But see D. MARTIN, MERGERS AND THE CLAY-
TON AcT 187 (1959) (concluding that the FTC did not begin a determined effort to amend
section 7 until 1935).
46. TNEC Report, supra note 45. For brief discussions of the case law on the asset
loophole, see Handler & Robinson, supra note 44, at 653-54; Comment, Corporate Consoli-
dation and the Concentration of Economic Power: Proposalsfor Revitalization of Section 7 of
the Clayton Act, 57 YALE L.J. 613, 620-21 (1948).
47. TNEC Report, supra note 45.
48. H.R. 1480, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
49. See Hearings on H. 515 Before Subcomna No. 2 of the House Comm on the
Judiciary, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 118-19 (1947) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 515 Hearings].
The language of current section 7, see note 7 supra, is interpreted in terms of reasonable
probabilities.
The reintroduced bill, H.R. 3736, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), did not adopt the com-
petitive standard of original section 7. That standard prohibited acquisitions "where the
effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen competition between the corpora-
tion whose stock is, or whose assets are, so acquired and the corporation making the ac-
quisiton, or to restrain such commerce in any section or community, or to tend to create a
monopoly of any line of commerce." Many congressmen expressed fear that this was not
the flexible approach to mergers that they desired, since taken literally, all horizontal mer-
gers would be barred. H. 515 Hearings, supra, at 22-24 & 118.
50. The House vote was 223 to 92, 117 not voting. 95 CONG. REc. 11506 (1949).
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ings, Senate approval followed in December 1950.1t President
Truman signed the bill on December 29, 1950.52
B. The Fear of Rising Concentration
During the 1940's, Congress perceived that concentration was
high and, more troubling, rising. 3 Many legislators were worried
over the consequences of failing to pass effective legislation to
blunt that rise. Representative Celler, floor manager and sponsor
of the bill that became amended section 7, argued that, without an
amendment, "big business will be hellbent for more and more
mergers. 54 The specter of more mergers drew impassioned pleas
from many quarters, including Kefauver, by then a Senator, who
decried the evils of having one's life controlled by individuals who
lived far away.55 There was even fear that increased concentra-
tion would transform America into a facist or socialist state.
5 6
Senator O'Conor, floor manager of the bill in the Senate, con-
cluded the debate by asserting that the amendment was necessary
to "protect and preserve the American system of free enter-
prise."57 Existing legislation was found unable to check these per-
ceived evils. Because of the asset loophole original section 7
would not stop untoward acquisitions. Nor, given Supreme Court
51. The Senate vote was 55 to 22, 19 not voting. 96 CONG. REc. 16507 (1950).
52. 1950 PUB. PAPERS 763.
53. See, e.g., H.R. 1480, supra note 48, at 4; TNEC Report, supra note 45. For a
summary of this point, see Bok, supra note 6, at 234-36.
There was considerable reliance on an FTC report, The Merger Movement: .4 Summary
Report. An analysis of the report and its use are found in D. MARTIN, supra note 45, at
230-33. A 1950 article revealed that the Commission was wrong--concentration was not
increasing. Lintner & Butters, The Effect of.Mergers on Industrial Concentration, 1940-47,
32 REv. ECON. STAT. 20 (1950). Although this article was discussed in the Senate debate,
proponents of the legislation discounted it. 96 CONG. REc. 16457 (1950). Congressional
reliance on the FTC report and the general fear of rising concentration prompted Professor
Adelman to remark that "[i]f it is revolting to decide a case on no better a ground than that
it was so decided under Henry IV-it is humiliating to have our courts decide it on the
basis of what economists showed nearly a decade ago was a made-up story." Adelman,
Economic 4spects fthe Bethelehem Opinion, 45 VA. L. Rav. 684, 685-86 (1959) (footnotes
omitted).
54. 95 CONG. REc. 11485 (1949) (statement of Rep. Celler).
55. Shall we permit the economy of the country to gravitate into the hands of a
few corporations, even though they may have very widespread stockholder distri-
bution, with central-office managers remote from the places where their products
are made, and the destiny of the people determined by the decisions of persons
who they never see, or even know of?
96 CONG. Rac. 16450 (1950) (statement of Sen. Kefauver).
56. See, e.g., 95 CONG. REc. 11486 (1949) (statement ofRep. Celler); 96 CONG. REc.
16507 (1950) (statement of Sen. O'Conor).
57. 96 CONG. REc. 16505 (1950) (statement of Sen. O'Conor).
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decisions, would the Sherman Act. 8
Although some have inferred that, fearing concentration, Con-
gress intended to stop mergers despite, or even because of, in-
creased efficiency,5 9 a close reading of the legislative history
supports the conclusion that the new law was not meant to pre-
clude efficiency as a justification for merger. Many feared concen-
tration because of its anticompetitive effects in fostering
collusion,6" a fear based on economic theory. As already demon-
strated, when increased concentration results in efficiency that
outweighs possible increases in market power, economic theory
supports the merger.61 Hence, to anyone concerned with the com-
petitive consequences of mergers, efficiency would be relevant and
generally count in favor of the merger.
Moreover, the legislative history reveals an assumption that it
was unnecessary to choose between concentration and ineffi-
ciency.62 Many congressmen believed that large mergers did not
usually increase efficiency, but rather that available efficiencies
were obtainable at sizes smaller than those of large or dominant
firms.63 If efficiency explained neither bigness nor the trend to-
ward concentration, one could oppose large mergers on both eco-
nomic and noneconomic grounds. On this assumption, there is no
harm in stopping large mergers, collusion might be deterred, and
social values furthered. However great the fear that concentration
would damage the American system, it was simply not felt that
efficiency need be sacrificed to safeguard free enterprise.64
58. See, e.g., United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920) (domi-
nant firm merger approved).
59. See note 42 supra.
60. Senator Kefauver, for example, argued that "the same economic ends can be
achieved through the power of giant corporations [formed by mergers] as through conspira-
cies." H.R. 2734 Hearings, supra note 45, at 14.
61. See notes 14-41 supra and accompanying text.
62. As Representative Celler stated, "Bigness does not mean efficiency, a better prod-
uct, or lower prices." 95 CONG. REC. 11486. See also id. at 11496 (statement of Rep.
Boggs); TNEC Report, supra note 45, at 13 (statement of President Roosevelt); id. at 292.
Thus, although it is in some' sense true that Congress "brushed aside" efficiency, Bok,
supra note 6, at 318, it was not because Congress thought that mergers would lead to a
choice between efficiency and deconcentration. While Congress preferred the
noneconomic advantages of deconcentrated markets to what it felt were no increases in the
costs of operations, the evidence does not reveal an intention to make efficiency irrelevant
in cases where it existed. See note 64 infra.
63. See, e.g., H. 2734 Hearings, supra note 45, at 8 (statement of Sen. O'Mahoney).
64. Courts should not use congressional skepticism about efficiency to ignore effi-
ciency justifications for merger. The possibility that mergers might lower costs is more
widely recognized today than it was in the 1940's. See, e.g., note 77 infra. Given that the
overall purpose of the 1950 amendment was to promote competition and not the welfare of
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This does not tell us, however, congressional reaction to a case
where concentration and efficiency both increased. Perhaps the
clear congressional concern over rising concentration indicated
that efficiency was to be ignored even where it might exist. In
evaluating this argument, it will be helpful to consider how Con-
gress responded to situations where mergers were believed to en-
hance efficiency.
C. Direct Evidence on Efficiency
Although not a major theme of the legislative history,65 effi-
ciency was occasionally discussed. Four aspects of the congres-
sional debates are relevant: treatment of efficiency in prior
approval bills, mergers of small firms to compete with larger firms,
mergers of failing companies, and an example concerning the
newspaper industry. When the possibility that a merger would in-
crease efficiency was raised, sponsors of the bill indicated that effi-
ciency was relevant as pointing toward legality.
1. The Prior Approval Bills
First among the six specific findings required under the origi-
nal TNEC bill was "that the acquisition is in the public interest
and will be promotive of greater efficiency and economy of pro-
duction, distribution, and management. 66 Thus, in the first seri-
ous effort to amend section 7, an efficiency defense existed.
Indeed, under the TNEC proposal, efficiencies had to be demon-
strated before the merger could be approved. Although many ef-
ficient mergers might have been prevented, particularly if rigorous
proof of efficiency were required, the bill did show that its propo-
nents thought efficiency to be relevant and to count in favor of a
merger.
Prior approval legislation was first introduced in Congress in
1943 with an efficiency standard approving the merger if it "would
not be incompatible with greater efficiency in economy of opera-
competitors, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 319-20 & 344 (1962), courts
would appropriately respond to that purpose by recognizing the possibility of efficiency
creation via merger. Moreover, as is argued below, Congress believed that when efficiency
exists it should count for a merger. See notes 66-82 infra and accompanying text.
65. "To anyone used to the preoccupation of professors and administrators with the
economic consequences of monopoly power, the curious aspect of the debates is the paucity
of remarks having to do with the effects of concentration on prices, innovation, distribu-
tion, and efficiency." Bok, supra note 6, at 236.
66. TNEC Report, supra note 45, at 39.
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tions."6 7 Where the TNEC would have required a positive show-
ing of efficiency, this version required only that the merger not
reduce efficiency. After hearings, the final prior approval bill was
reintroduced in 1945 with no efficiency requirement at all.
6 8
What, if anything, can be made of the history of the efficiency
defense under the prior approval bills?6 9 Deletion of an efficiency
defense cannot be interpreted as a rejection of the defense or as a
congressional decision to trade off concentration and efficiency.
7 °
Although those supporting the bill deleted the efficiency finding,
the apparent reason for the deletion is consistent with a congres-
sional sensitivity to the procompetitive importance of efficiency.
Kefauver explained the shift to the "not incompatible" standard
as necessary to avoid blocking too many mergers." Deletion of
the "not incompatible" requirement followed the National Associ-
ation of Manufacturers' attack on the requirement as too burden-
some,72 and accordingly appears to have been based upon similar
67. S. 577 & H.R. 1517, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943). See Handler & Robinson, supra
note 44, at 655.
It is not clear how the tradeoff between efficiency and increased market power would
have been accomplished under the prior approval bills. Given the belief that stopping
mergers did not involve an efficiency sacrifice and the ignorance of the tradeoff model, this
is not surprising.
68. H.R. 4519, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. quoted in Hearings on HR. 2357 Before a Sub-
comm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. at 371-72 (1945) [herein-
after cited as HR. 2357 Hearings]. Prior approval was required only if the merger involved
at least a five percent share of the market. Id.
69. Some commentators argue that little can be concluded from the prior history of
unsuccessful bills. Bok, supra note 6, at 251. While this may be true about the general
history of section 7, it is not true for the efficiency question, at least insofar as the history
reveals the attitude of Kefauver, who sponsored both the prior approval bills and the legis-
lation that ultimately passed. There is no evidence that Kefauver's attitude changed be-
tween his sponsorship of the prior approval bills and of the act that bears his name.
70. See Blair, Conglomerate Mergers-Theory and Congressional Intent, in PUBLIC
POLtCY TOWARD MERGERS 179, 189-91 (J. Weston & S. Peltzman eds. 1969) for such an
interpretation.
71. [T]here is a substantial difference between an administrative affirmative find-
ing that a proposed merger will promote greater efficiency and economy and a
finding that it will not be incompatible with that result. I can well understand
why an administrative agency would hesitate to make such an affirmative finding
in any but the most obvious circumstances and this would tend to block a large
proportion of all mergers on that score alone. By contrast under the [current]
provisions, while mergers found to be incompatible with greater efficiency and
economy could not meet the required standard, mergers found to be compatible
and those found to be not incompatible with that standard could be approved,
provided all the other requirements were met.
Letter from Senator Kefauver to the Yale Law Journal (Dec. 8, 1947) reprinted in id. at 190.
The letter is also cited in Comment, supra note 46, at 626 n.59.
72. H.R. 2357 Hearings, supra note 65, at 369. The National Association of Manufac-
turers seemed to have read the "not incompatible" standard to require a finding similar to
the earlier standard of promoting greater efficiency. Id.
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grounds. Both changes would have permitted more, not fewer,
mergers. As such, dropping the requirement does not manifest a
desire to strike down even efficient mergers.
2. Mergers Between Relatively Small Firms
The legislative history of amended section 7 reveals that two
relatively small firms could legally merge to offer increased com-
petition to larger companies. For example, in response to a ques-
tion whether two small manufacturers of an automobile part
could merge to facilitate competion with a larger concern that has
lower costs, Representative Celler answered:
[tihere is nothing whatsoever that will prevent those corpora-
tions-you call them small corporations-from merging. In the
first place they are small corporations. Small corporations do
not come within the purview of this act. In the case you have
indicated there would be an increase of competition-not a
suppression of competition.73
Thus, a sponsor of the bill approved a merger, albeit between
"small" corporations, that would, despite increased concentration
in an industry that was already at least somewhat concentrated,
increase competition because of lower costs.
3. Failing Companies
The legislative history also demonstrates that even major firms
could legally acquire competitors who were "failing." For exam-
ple, during the Senate debate, Senator Thye described a small mill
that could no longer survive and asked whether a big mill could
purchase its smaller, struggling competitor and bring its assets to a
73. 95 CONG. REC. 11488 (1949) (statement of Rep. Celler).
The argument might be made that this small business exception was created to insure
that de minimis mergers were not challenged. The legislative history, however, shows that
the exception is broader than just de minimis mergers. Most discussions of de minimis
mergers during the legislative history concerned the elimination of the 1914 standard that,
read literally, barred all horizontal mergers. See note 49 supra. The 1914 language was
modified to prevent de minimis mergers from being held illegal. See HR. 515 Hearings,
supra note 49, at 112-19, 259. Given this reason for modification of the 1914 language, it i§
difficult to believe that anyone would construe the amendment to cover de minimis mer-
gers. Hence, the repeated references to small business mergers presumably make a differ-
ent, or at least a broader, point. Finally, discussions of small business mergers did not arise
only in the context of trivial mergers, but often arose in discussions of small firms compet-
ing with bigger companies. Discussion of such competition would seem to imply concern
for efficiency. Although Congress appeared to think that big firms did not normally need
to merge for efficiency reasons, a different attitude appeared to prevail regarding their rela-
tively smaller competitors. Bok agrees that the small business example was not limited to
de minimis mergers. Bok, supra note 6, at 241.
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large milling center. After Senator O'Mahoney, TNEC Chairman
and sponsor of the first bill to amend section 7, replied affirma-
tively, Senator Thye stated that he raised the question to insure
that small businesses could still sell to large businesses because
large firms "can conduct the operation more efficiently."74
Nevertheless, Derek Bok argues that efficiency "cannot be ac-
corded much importance in accounting for the [failing company]
exception."" His argument-that Congress was generally uncon-
cerned with efficiency--does not, however, justify his conclusion.
Instead, this lack of concern reflected a belief that most mergers
did not increase efficiency.76 For mergers that appeared to lower
costs, the legislative history reveals support for such acquisitions,
the failing company doctrine being but one example.77
4. The Newspaper Example
An important exchange concerning the role of efficiency under
the amendment occurred between Senator Kefauver, a principal
sponsor of the bill, and Senator O'Conor, floor manager of the
bill. Kefauver was concerned with whether "two newspapers
might enter into an operating arrangement whereby, in order to
save the expense of operating in two separate buildings, they would
have an arrangement by which one plant would print both news-
papers, with each one following its own editorial policy. ' 78 Sena-
tor O'Conor responded:
[T]his bill, if enacted, would not have adverse effects upon such
a proposal as he describes....
[N]o such proposed consideration or acquisition would be vio-
74. 96 CONG. REC. 16445 (1950) (statement of Sen. Thye). Senator O'Mahoney then
thanked "the Senator for his example." Id.
75. Bok, supra note 6, at 340. He instead argues that "perhaps the strongest reason
...stemmed from a legislative concern over the various interests involved in the life of a
failing enterprise." Id. Although this concern was no doubt relevant, efficiency cannot be
dismissed as easily as Bok does, as the text following this footnote indicates. See also R.
POSNER, supra note 6, at 20-22 (discussing nonefficiency reasons for the doctrine).
76. See notes 62-65 supra and accompanying text.
77. Since the efficiency involved in the failing business case may often be a subclass of
the efficiencies facilitated by the market for corporate control, see note 164 infra and ac-
companying text, the question arises why Congress did not explicitly recognize this market.
The benefits of the market for control, however, were not made known to Congress, which
is not surprising since the leading article on the subject was not written until 1965. See
Manne, Mergers and the Mfarketfor Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965).
For a final example of congressional unwillingness to protect small businesses at the
expense of efficiency, see H 515 Hearings, supra note 49, at 47-48 (statement of Rep.
Case).
78. 96 CONG. REC. 16456 (1950) (statement of Sen. Kefauver) (emphasis added).
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lative of the law, unless in a section of the country it would
result in a substantial lessening of competition in industry gen-
erally. It may well be that by effecting a better arrangementfor a
moreprofitable undertaking, in the manner described, competition
would be stimulated rather than lessened.7 9
Again, when confronted with the suggestion that a merger
would increase efficiency, the leading proponents of the bill sug-
gested that efficiency would count in favor of the merger.
D. Indirect Evidence
Two points deserve emphasis. First, Congress wanted mergers
to be evaluated in the context of the particular industry involved,
along with the broad range of relevant economic evidence. 80 As
the Senate Report to the amendment stated, "full consideration
will be given to all matters bearing upon the maintenance of com-
petition, including the circumstances giving rise to the acquisi-
tion.""1 Since efficiency is one of several potentially significant
competitive attributes of a merger, as well as a reason for merging,
it would accordingly seem relevant.
Second, the conduct of the amendment's opponents is instruc-
tive. The opponents showed little concern over efficiency, other
than questioning the legality of certain types of mergers, such as
those between small firms, where efficiency might be involved.
The bill's proponents diffused opposition based on such lost effi-
ciency by arguing that these mergers would be legal or at least that
the lower costs would be relevant in the decisional calculus.82 If
79. Id. (statement of Sen. O'Conor) (emphasis added).
80. See the discussion of the legislative history of section 7 in Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 311-23.
81. S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1950).
82. Even opponents of the bill did not seek to argue that the interests of large
companies would be infringed unwisely or unfairly by the bill. Instead, their op-
position was pitched on such arguments as the excessive authority given the Fed-
eral Trade Commission, the vagueness of the act, the danger that small businesses
might find it hard to sell out, and the fact that concentration was not in fact in-
creasing.
Bok, supra note 6, at 307 n.252.
There were, of course, exceptions. For example, it was argued that the bill would hin-
der small and medium-sized companies from lowering costs by forever foreclosing their
opportunity to approximate the size or efficiency enjoyed by their larger competitors. 95
CONG. RFc. 11487 (1949) (statement of Rep. Goodwin). To the extent that his argument
was involved with the small firm mergers already discussed, this fear was effectively rebut-
ted. A detailed statement was presented during the hearings, part of which suggested that
corporations were big because they were successful at pleasing consumers, a form of effi-
ciency. H.R 2734Hearings, supra note 45, at 224-36 (statement of Prof. King). The mem-
bers of the subcommittee, however, did not pursue this inquiry into the basic assumptions
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efficiency were to be irrelevant under the bill--or a reason for ille-
gality--opponents would probably have raised this point, just as
opponents of the prior approval bills had done regarding the treat-
ment of efficiency in those proposals. This failure to raise ques-
tions about efficiency indicates that efficiency was neither
irrelevant to nor intended to militate against the legality of a
merger.
E. Summary
Congress did not intend to trade off efficiency and concentra-
tion.83 On the contrary, Congress did not believe that inefficiency
would result from a tougher antimerger law. Nor did Congress
intend that increased efficiency count against a merger. Although
the issue was not squarely addressed, indeed efficiency was infre-
quently discussed, the evidence indicates that increased efficiency
weighs in favor of a merger. Congress wanted mergers to stand or
fall upon a host of economic considerations, including efficiency.
III. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE EFFICIENCY
JUSTIFICATION
Some have read the Supreme Court's interpretations of section
7 to preclude an efficiency justification and perhaps even to hold
that efficiency can be used to condemn a merger. 4 The first three
parts of this section analyze the Court's major statements on effi-
ciency in the context in which they were made, including the de-
velopment of the arguments at trial and before the Court. 5 The
underlying the legislation. Instead, they chose to discuss Professor King's favorite profes-
sors while he attended the University of Nebraska. Id. at 243.
83. For a concurring view, see Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1313, 1326 (1965).
It is true, however, that Congress recognized the so-called "entrenchment" theory by
which a merger might be illegal if the acquisition gave the new firm "decisive" advantages
over its competitors. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949). Never-
theless, this theory does not represent a general attack on efficiency, and can be employed
only under limited circumstances. See notes 128-32 infra and accompanying text.
84. See, e.g., Department of Justice Press Release, Merger Guidelines, supra note 5;
notes 112-44 infra and accompanying text.
85. Placing the statements in their respective contexts is crucial because the Court was
responding to aspects of the cases that can only be understood completely within those
contexts. Of course, the Court could have reached out to address the issue of an efficiency
justification regardless of the context of that issue before it. As we shall see below, how-
ever, the Court does not appear to have taken this step. Nor does the analysis attempt to
study the question from the standpoint of predicting how the Court would (as opposed to
should) decide the efficiency issue. The Warren Court-the Court that decided most of the
opinions discussed in this section--often mishandled economic analysis, and hence a pre-
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discussion concludes with an examination of other cases relevant
to determining whether the Court has precluded an efficiency jus-
tification.
A. Brown Shoe
In November 1955, the Justice Department challenged the
proposed merger between Brown Shoe Company and G. R. Kin-
ney Company, both of whom retailed and manufactured shoes . 6
The government argued that the merger, particularly in its vertical
integration between manufacturing and retailing, was anticom-
petitive because, inter alia, it lowered prices. Much of the trial and
the arguments that followed involved government attempts to
show that vertical integration allowed the new firm to reduce re-
tail prices as much as $2.00 or $3.00 a pair.87 Brown expended a
like amount of effort denying that any such advantage existed.
In finding the merger illegal, the district court echoed the gov-
ernment, noting:
[I]ndependent retailers of shoes are having a harder and harder
time in competing with company-owned and company-con-
trolled retail outlets. National advertising by large concerns
has increased their brand name acceptability and retail stores
handling the brand named shoes have a definite advertising ad-
vantage. Company-owned and company-controlled retail
stores have definite advantages in buying and credit; they have
further advantages in advertising, insurance, inventory control
and assists [sic] and price control. These advantages result in
lower prices or in higher qualiyfor the same price and the in-
dependent retailer can no longer compete in the low and me-
dium-priced fields and has been driven to concentrate his
business in the higher-priced, higher-quality type of
shoes-and, the higher the price, the smaller the market. He
diction of no defense would have been warranted for the Court. But this article shows that
the Warren Court did not decide the issue. The Court has since become more receptive to
economic analysis, see notes 139-53 infra and accompanying text, although the current
Court has also not decided the efficiency issue.
86. Neither Brown nor Kinney had large national market shares. Brown's four per-
cent share in manufacturing made it the nation's fourth largest manufacturer. See
Peterman, The Brown Shoe Case, 18 J. LAW & ECON. 81 (1975). While Kinney operated
"the largest family-style shoe store chain in the United States," Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 303 (1962), its sales accounted for only 1.2% of all national retail sales.
Id.
87. The first five volumes of the record are replete with discussions of possible lower
prices. For a discussion of this evidence, see Peterman, supra note 86, at 111-35.
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has been placed in this position, not by choice, but by neces-
sity.88
Because of advantages such as these, the court concluded that "the
merger would establish a manufacturer-retailer relationship which
deprives all but the top firms in the industry of a fair opportunity
to compete." 89
On appeal to the Supreme Court, both sides filed extensive
briefs, perhaps in part because Brown Shoe was to be the first ma-
jor substantive decision under amended section 7. Although
Brown devoted most of its 200-plus pages to the factual back-
ground and the appropriate product and geographic markets, it
discussed some of the efficiency-creating possibilities of the
merger, including those that the district court had found. Brown
denied the existence of advantages associated with integration, 90
asserting instead that the "undisputed facts" showed that the verti-
cal integration produced no economic advantages9 and that, at
the retail level, "small independent retailers are efficient and able
to compete with other shoe outlets-there are no significant econ-
omies of size in shoe retailing."92 Thus, Brown denied what, by
any definition, is a consumer benefit resulting from increased effi-
ciency.
The record does provide only minimal support for the district
court's efficiency findings.93 Thus, while Brown could not perhaps
have argued in good faith that the merger increased efficiency in
the manner indicated, it need not have acquiesced in the argument
that benefiting consumers was an evil. Furthermore, other effi-
88. United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 179 F. Supp. 721, 738 (E.D. Mo. 1959) (empha-
sis added).
89. Id. at 741.
90. For example, Brown stated that "the so-called 'advantages' enjoyed by company-
owned and company-controlled retail outlets, which the district court purported to find, are
not borne out by the record. There is nothing to show that any possible advantages of the
acquisition will be decisive." Brief for Petitioner at 111, Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294 (1962).
91. Id. at 182. Further, in a six-page section entitled "The so-called advantages en-
joyed by company-controlled and company-owned retail outlets," Brown denied point by
point the advantages that the district court had found. For example, Brown contended the
record did not support the district court's finding that the merger resulted in lower prices or
in higher quality for the same price. Id. at 193-99.
92. Id. at 177.
93. Peterman, supra note 86, at 106-17, discusses the vertical aspects of the case. Al-
though there was evidence in the record that Brown did have lower costs than some of its
competitors, that evidence was not linked to vertical integration. Indeed, there was very
little evidence or even discussion of advantages that related strictly to vertical integration.
Instead, there were merely the statements by relatively small competitors of Brown and
Kinney, claiming that the more efficient vertically integrated firms had hurt smaller firms.
See, e.g., Record, Vol. 1, at 350-68; Record, Vol. 2, at 88-94.
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ciency arguments were possible yet not pursued.94 At the very
least Brown owed some cogent explanation of why the merger oc-
curred, yet it provided little information, particularly regarding
whether the merger made economic sense.95
The government's brief is also troubling. Like Brown's, most
of the government's attention went to two of the three major issues
involved: defining the relevant product and geographic markets.
In discussing the third issue, the merger's anticompetitive effect,
the government relied on testimony of independent retailers to as-
semble a compendium of "evils" that the merger allegedly caused:
creating lower costs, permitting better quality, allowing Brown to
94. In its brief, Brown gave little reason for acquiring Kinney other than that Brown
wanted to enter the retail market by merger rather than de novo. Its reasons were twofold.
First, Brown felt that its relative inexperience in retailing made merger the best means of
expansion into the retail market. Second, Kinney's long record of success in its part of the
retail market made it a particularly lucrative acquisition. Brief for Petitioner at 100. Dur-
ing the trial, three other reasons were advanced, each of which revealed the possibility of
lower costs. First, the president of Kinney suggested that Brown could produce at a lower
cost than Kinney and that Brown could help Kinney improve its manufacturing. Record,
Vol. 3, at 1449-51. The record, however, contains little other evidence on this matter. See
Peterman, supra note 86, at 132-37. Presumably these statements had some basis in fact
which could have been elaborated and tested. Second, Peterman suggests a possible effi-
ciency explanation growing out of the desire of retailers to enter the burgeoning, new mar-
ketplace--the shopping center-that was rapidly expanding during the 1950's. Peterman,
supra note 86, at 135-37. Independent retailers, with whom Brown primarily dealt, were
expected to decline in number, thus forcing Brown to decide how best to secure distribution
in shopping centers. Although shopping centers were explicitly discussed at trial and
Brown indicated its desire to enter the shopping centers other than by de novo entry, it did
not suggest an efficiency explanation for not simply adjusting its production plans to supply
those firms that would expand in relative importance as shopping centers grew. Finally,
Peterman hypothesizes possible benefits from integration as opposed to contracting. Id. at
133-35. Peterman did not test this hypothesis, nor did the proceedings provide evidence on
the issue. The argument is a transaction cost one, a form of efficiency that will be subse-
quently discussed. See notes 155-65 infra and accompanying text.
95. As Peterman concludes:
Given the government's approach, Brown seems to have been led to reveal as
little as possible about the expected gains from its merger with Kinney. The result
was that the proceedings were conducted in a way which made it very difficult to
discover or understand the economic arrangements in the shoe industry.
Peterman, supra note 86, at 143-44.
Significantly, Brown passed up the unique opportunity to argue explicitly an efficiency
justification under amended section 7 before the Supreme Court had interpreted that sec-
tion. Brown did criticize the district court's reasoning, quoted in the text accompanying
note 88 supra, by arguing that it was error to equate injury to competitors with injury to
competition. Brown did not, however, pursue this point further.
Another puzzling aspect of the appellant's brief is its treatment of the legislative history.
Brown made only five brief references to the history of amended section 7, while the gov-
ernment cited the history twenty-five times, despite the history being more supportive of
Brown on the efficiency question than it is of the government's position. See notes 42-83
supra and accompanying text.
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"utilize the modem efficient Kinney retail organization to intro-
duce new styles", developing merchandising and promotional in-
novations, and-the ultimate anticompetitive act-lowering
prices.96
Only against this background can the Supreme Court discus-
sion of efficiency in Brown Shoe be understood. In considering
the legality of the horizontal aspects of the merger, the Court men-
tioned the efficiencies that the lower court had found:
A third significant aspect of this merger is that it creates a large
national chain which is integrated with a manufacturing opera-
tion. The retail outlets of integrated companies, by eliminating
wholesalers and by increasing the volume of purchases from
the manufacturing division of the enterprise, can market their
own brands at prices below those of competing independent re-
tailers. Of course, some of the results of large integrated or
chain operations are beneficial to consumers. Their expansion
is not rendered unlawful by the mere fact that small independ-
ent stores may be adversely affected. It is competition, not
competitors, which the Act protects. But we cannot fail to rec-
ognize Congress' desire to promote competition through the
protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses. Congress
appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might result
from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It
resolved these competing considerations in favor of decentrali-
zation. We must give effect to that decision.97
This baffling passage raises several observations and questions.
First, the passage effectively states that while a merger is not un-
lawful merely because small competitors may be adversely af-
fected, a merger will be unlawful when competition may be
adversely affected.98 Second, at the end of the section on vertical
mergers, the Court implied that the merger might be saved if it
produced "any countervailing competitive, economic, or social ad-
vantages."9 9 At the end of the section on horizontal mergers, the
opinion again implied that "mitigating factors" might save the
merger."° Why then did Chief Justice Warren fail to find that the
consumer benefits qualified as countervailing economic advan-
tages or as mitigating factors? Perhaps Brown's failure to argue
96. Brief for Respondent at 48, 121, 135-36. In its reply brief, Brown again denied
that the merger lowered costs. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 33-37.
97. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
98. See Bork & Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust, 65 COLLIM. L. REv. 363, 373 (1965).
99. 370 U.S. at 334.
100. Id. at 346. Although the Court mentioned small firm mergers and the failing com-
pany defense in discussing mitigating factors, it did not limit mitigating factors to these
possibilities. Id.
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efficiency as a defense was crucial, particularly since it allowed the
Court to conclude that Brown had presented no mitigating fac-
tors. 1o
Third, that the Court discussed the advantages of vertical inte-
gration under the horizontal merger section of the opinion is puz-
zling. The Court appears confused, as it also does in other parts of
the horizontal merger section. Besides this confusion and the am-
biguity over whether harm to small business leads to illegality, the
Court, in the space of but a few pages, argued that the merger was
harmful both because it led or might lead to higher prices and
then because it led to lower prices.10 2 Finally, recall that Congress
did not require a tradeoff between concentration and ineffiency.1
03
In fact, in a passage preceeding the one quoted above, the Brown
Shoe Court correctly concluded that Congress wanted to deter
only mergers "having demonstrable anticompetitive effects ...
Taken as a whole, the legislative history illuminates congressional
concern with the protection of competition, not competitors, and its
desire to restrain mergers only to the extent that such combina-
tions may tend to lessen competition.' 4 This passage appears to
mandate an economic approach to merger cases, and thus conflicts
directly with the other Brown Shoe passage quoted earlier.10 5 The
Court gave no explanation for its inconsistent views of the legisla-
tive history.
The Brown Shoe opinion leaves the efficiency defense in
limbo. Not only is the opinion not definitive, it is also internally
inconsistent, once within a space of two sentences. 0 6 Perhaps
most importantly, the Court was confronted with the government
argument and the district court finding that the merger was illegal
because it lowered prices, while the defendant denied that it had
such an effect. In this context, it is perhaps surprising that the
Court was as cautious as it was on the efficiency issue. In any
event, the Court simply neither was presented with, nor did it
squarely address, the issue of efficiency as a justification.
101. Id
102. Id. at 340-44.
103. See notes 59-64 supra and accompanying text.
104. 370 U.S. at 319-20 (emphasis in the original). For interpretations of this passage
similar to that of this paper, see R. POSNER, supra note 6, at 101-05; 1 P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, supra note 31, at 11. Further, the Court noted that mergers were to be function-
ally viewed within a broad range of relevant economic evidence. 370 U.S. at 321-22.
105. See text accompanying note 97 supra.
106. Id.
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B. Philadelphia National Bank
In February 1961, the Justice Department challenged a merger
between the Philadelphia National Bank (PNB) and Girard Trust
Corn Exchange Bank, the second and third largest commercial
banks headquartered in the Philadelphia metropolitan area. Al-
though the government presented opinion testimony that the
merger would hurt small banks, it did not stress efficiency as the
problem with the merger. 10 7 The argument that prevailed in the
Supreme Court was that the increase in concentration in an al-
ready oligopolistic market facilitated noncompetitive perform-
ance. 
108
The bank attempted to justify the merger. Although by no
means its major justification,0 9 one of PNB's arguments was that
Philadelphia needed a larger bank to develop new business and
stimulate economic development. 110 In finding for the govern-
ment, the Court commented upon this justification:
107. For a discussion of this testimony, see United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,
201 F. Supp. 348, 353 (E.D. Pa. 1962). Although the government may have been using this
evidence to attack Brown Shoe-type efficiency, the Court in Philadelphia Nat'l Bank criti-
cized reliance on testimony of competitors, thus indirectly criticizing Brown Shoe. The
Court noted that high profits by competitors of the merged firm did not support the merger
since competitors could prosper under the higher prices of noncompetitive conduct, yet the
market could be extremely noncompetitive. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374
U.S. 321, 367 n.43 (1963). Conversely, when competitors complain, it could be an indica-
tion that competition is very effective.
108. The merged bank controlled at least 30% of the relevant market and the merger
increased two-bank concentration from 44% to 59%. 374 U.S. at 363-65.
109. According to PNB, the fundamental reason for the merger was to secure an in-
creased lending limit which would allow it to remain competitive in the large loan market
with out-of-state banks, particularly those in New York. 374 U.S. at 370. The Court re-
sponded:
We reject this application of the concept of "countervailing power." If anticom-
petitive effects in one market could be justified by procompetitive consequences in
another, the logical upshot would be that every firm in an industry could, without
violating section 7, embark on a series of mergers that would make it in the end as
large as the industry leader. For if all the commercial banks in the Philadelphia
area merged into one, it would be smaller than the largest bank in New York
City.
Id. (citation omitted).
Although a detailed discussion of this argument is beyond the scope of this article, a
few comments are relevant. Although the justification is not necessarily based on lower
costs, by requiring balancing, it resembles the efficiency tradeoff already discussed. See
notes 18-24 supra and accompanying text. Even if the above-quoted passage is read ex-
pansively to conclude that efficiency in one market could not justify anticompetitive effects
in another market, it would still not preclude efficiency evidence in the market at issue.
For a discussion of this aspect of Philadelphia Nat'! Bank that also distinguishes between
the justification discussed in this footnote and an efficiency justification, see Pitofsky, supra
note 42, at 1071-73.
110. 374 U.S. at 334, 371; Brief for Respondent at 17, 70.
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We are clear, however, that a merger the effect of which "may
be substantially to lessen competition" is not saved because, on
some ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits and cred-
its, it may be deemed beneficial. A value choice of such magni-
tude is beyond the ordinary limits of judicial competence, and
in any event, has been made for us already, by Congress when
it enacted the amended § 7. Congress determined to preserve
our traditionally competitive economy. It therefore proscribed
anticompetitive mergers, the benign and the malignant alike,
fully aware, we must assume, that some price might have to be
paid.111
Although one court has cited this passage as precluding an effi-
ciency defense," 2 the language cannot within its context be so
read. The Court was not responding to a justification that lower
costs benefit competition in the relevant geographic market. Al-
though PNB had offered testimony at trial that the merger would
result in economies of scale," 3 when the lower court did not men-
tion this justification and PNB did not pursue it on appeal, the
Court considered the point abandoned.' 1 4 Instead of a tradeoff
between efficiency and market power, the bank in effect suggested
that even if the merger would decrease competition the Court
should balance this decrease against other beneficial impacts on
the Philadelphia community. The Court did say that the merger
could not be saved by an "ultimate reckoning of. . . economic
debits and credits," but in this context, "economic" does not refer
to lowering costs, but instead to benefits to the economic environ-
ment of the Philadelphia community. Had the Court engaged in
the suggested balancing it would have set sail on the "sea of
doubt" that antitrust courts have long eschewed. 15 The quoted
111. 374 U.S. at 371.
112. See International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 518 F.2d 913,
936 (9th Cir. 1975).
113. Record at 1595, 1607, United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 201 F. Supp. 348
(E.D. Pa. 1962).
114. 374 U.S. at 334-35 n.10.
115. From the earliest days of the antitrust laws, courts have rejected justifications for
blatantly anticompetitive practices, even when the practices purportedly kept prices "rea-
sonable", prevented "cut-throat" competition, or produced other alleged benefits. See, e.g.,
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modofedanda f 'd,
175 U.S. 211 (1899). The "sea of doubt" phrase was coined by Judge Taft in .ddyston. 85
F. at 287. For a discussion of how this development is consistent with using economic
evidence and excluding evidence such as that offered by the bank, see Bork, The Rule of
Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing andMarket Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373 (1966).
See also National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689-92
(1978).
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passage from Philadelphia National Bank represents but another
example of the Court's longstanding refusal to let practices, found
under economic analysis to be anticompetitive in the relevant
market, escape condemnation because of some alleged general
benefits to society as a whole or because the results of competition
were considered untoward. Read in its context, the Court is sup-
porting the use of economic analysis, not rejecting it.
Indeed, that the thrust of Philadelphia National Bank is almost
entirely economic was amply demonstrated when the Court
echoed the then conventional economic criticism of concentra-
tion.116 Moreover, the Court did not establishper se rules against
specified levels of concentration, but instead would have allowed
"evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have
• . .anticompetitive effects." ' 1 7 Efficiency, of course, can consti-
tute such evidence. 18
A final reason which prevents the quoted passage from being
read to preclude an efficiency justification concerns the Court's
apparent refusal to hear justifications once the merger is found to
be anticompetitive. Since this point is also relevant to the Court's
Procter & Gamble decision, it will be considered with that case."
9
C. Procter & Gamble
In September 1957, the Federal Trade Commission challenged
the acquisition of Clorox Chemical Company, the nation's largest
manufacturer of liquid household bleach, by Procter & Gamble
Company (P&G), the largest producer of soaps, detergents, and
related products. Although the Commission believed that
increased efficiency should not always count against mergers, 20
one of its principal arguments rested upon lower costs, particu-
larly the belief that P&G, which had previously not sold bleach,
could obtain advertising at a twenty-five to thirty percent discount
116. The consensus regarding the market concentration doctrine was, in its simplest
form, that there was a close correlation between concentration and noncompetitive per-
formance. Such a consensus no longer exists. See generally INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION:
THE NEw LEARNING (H. Goldschmid, et al. eds. 1974).
117. 374 U.S. at 363.
118. See notes 14-41 supra and accompanying text.
119. Whether Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972), expands Philadel-
phia Nat Bank is discussed later. See notes 142-46 infra and accompanying text.
120. "In general, advantages afforded by merger which reflect simply greater efficien-
cies ought not to be a basis for holding the merger illegal; efficiency is, after all, the prime
goal of antitrust. But that principal is inapplicable we believe to the circumstances of the
case." Brief for Petitioner at 47, FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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over that available to Clorox. 2 ' These discounts, together with
P&G's extensive financial resources, had "increased the power of
Clorox, by dominating its competitors and discouraging new en-
try, to foreclose effective competition in the industry."'122 More-
over, the Commission felt that bleach advertising did not promote
competition, but instead meaninglessly differentiated the prod-
uct.' 23  Accordingly, any savings in advertising costs harmed,
rather than aided, competition.
P&G countered that the advantages, particularly the advertis-
ing discounts, were nonexistent.124 Because Clorox already mar-
keted its product as effectively as possible, P&G could only try to
do as well. 125 Although correct about the discounts, 126 P&G can
be faulted for inadequately justifying the merger and perhaps for
failing to raise efficiency as a justification. Internal P&G memo-
randa recommending the acquisition predicted that there would
be large savings in promotion, sales, and distribution, but the
company did not present evidence of these efficiencies during the
litigation. 12
7
One of the anticompetitive effects cited by the Supreme Court
in striking down the merger was related to the size and promi-
nence of P&G.128 In an argument that has come to be known as
"entrenchment," the Court expressed the fear that the substitution
of P&G for Clorox would make smaller bleach firms wary of reac-
tion by P&G and hence more cautious in competing. The substi-
tution would also cause potential entrants to be more reluctant to
enter the market to face P&G than they would have been to face
Clorox. Although entrenchment can encompass an attack upon
121. Procter & Gamble Co., 63 F.T.C. 1465, 1501, 1563-65 (1963).
122. Id. at 1569. Although in the 1960's most economists were hostile to product differ-
entiation of the P&G and Clorox variety, this consensus no longer exists. See generally
INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEw LEARNING, supra note 116.
Although in administrative proceedings, the FTC and its staff listed many possible
sources of lower costs, 63 F.T.C. at 1502-15, including management and distribution, on
final appeal the efficiency arguments were limited to financial resources and discounts. 386
U.S. at 580.
123. 63 F.T.C. at 1580-82.
124. Brief for Respondent at 35-41; see also Peterman, The Clorox Case and Television
Rate Structures, I1 J. L. & ECON. 321, 339 (1968).
125. Brief for Respondent at 34-35.
126. In fact, Clorox and P&G purchased television advertising at the same rate. Al-
though there was a difference in price between network and local advertising, neither com-
pany bought network advertising time for bleach. Peterman, supra note 124.
127. For a discussion of these reports, see 63 F.T.C. at 1541-42.
128. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 572 (1968). The other effect that the
Court found concerned elimination of potential competition. Id.
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efficiency, 129 it does not, at least for mergers where entrenchment
is not an issue, preclude an efficiency justification. Moreover, be-
cause of its theoretical weakness 130 and because of the unusual
facts of Procter & Gamble, the doctrine would appear to have very
limited application. P&G, probably the most successful marketer
of consumer goods in the world,' 3 ' acquired the dominant firm in
a concentrated industry where, compared to firms in most indus-
tries under antitrust scrutiny, that dominant firm was small.' 32 In
few, if any, other cases is the entrenchment doctrine as appealing.
Of more importance to an efficiency justification was the
Court's statement that: "Possible economies cannot be used as a
defense to illegality. Congress was aware that some mergers
which lessen competition may also result in economies but struck
the balance in favor of protecting competition.,' 33
Although again seeming to preclude an efficiency justifica-
tion,134 a close reading belies such a conclusion. To begin with,
the passage immediately follows the Court's discussion of en-
trenchment and precedes the discussion of other anticompetitive
effects. In that context, the statement can be limited to precluding
efficiency as a defense to entrenchment. Further, the words "pos-
sible", "illegality", and "lessen competition" are crucial. For
economies to be a justification, the merged firm must show that
lower costs are more certain than merely possible, making the effi-
ciency defense proposed in this article distinguishable from the
defense that aroused the Court's concern. In deciding whether a
129. Often the entrenchment argument seems to consist mainly of a general fear of the
"deep pockets" of large businesses. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,
523 F.2d 262, 268-70 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 429 U.S. 477
(1976). See notes 148-51 infra and accompanying text. One of the reasons small firms
should fear larger ones, indeed perhaps the only logical reason, is lower costs of the larger
firms. The P&G Court did not consider the anticompetitive implications of this point. The
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has suggested that entrenchment ap-
plies only to pecuniary, not real, economies. See Emhart Corp. v. USM Corp., 527 F.2d
177, 182 (Ist Cir. 1975). The real/pecuniary distinction is discussed in note 155 infra.
130. The entrenchment argument is anomalous because it implies that P&G should not
have been allowed to enter the bleach market, even were it to do so through internal expan-
sion. See R. POSNER, supra note 6, at 119-20.
131. P&G dominates several industries, often after entry against large, successful firms.
For a discussion of P&G's organization and its successes, see 63 F.T.C. at 1484-85,
1498-1502.
132. Clorox had annual sales slightly less than $40 million, while P&G's were nearly 30
times larger. 386 U.S. at 571-72.
133. 386 U.S. at 380 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344
(1962)).
134. See, e.g., Mantell, Conglomerate Mergers, Ailocative Efficiency, and Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 56 TEX. L. REV. 207, 218 (1978).
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merger is illegal, the focus is upon whether it lessens competition.
As economic theory 35 and basic antitrust principles establish, effi-
ciency is one of the variables in the competition calculus and one
of the reasons competition is valued.136 Therefore, a merger's le-
gality turns in part on the existence and magnitude of econo-
mies. 137 At the worst for an efficiency defense, then, the passage is
highly confusing. Finally, the parties did not place the issue of a
general efficiency justification before the Court. The government
did not contend that all efficiencies are irrelevant, nor did the de-
fendant assert an efficiency defense. Thus, it cannot be said that
the Court was responding to an argument that efficiency could (or
could not) justify a merger.138
D. Other Decisions
Although not so well known as the cases already discussed,
other decisions are relevant to the issue of an efficiency justifica-
tion. A discussion of these cases provides some evidence that effi-
ciency can indeed justify mergers.
1. Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.' 3
9
Tampa agreed to purchase from Nashville all the coal required
over twenty years for boiler fuel at a power station. A dispute
subsequently arose during which Nashville claimed that this long-
term requirements contract violated section 3 of the Clayton Act.
In finding that the contract was permissible, the Court stated that
the advantages of the arrangement, such as reducing the risk and
the transaction costs that the parties would face from having to
135. See notes 14-41 supra and accompanying text.
136. See note I supra and accompanying text.
137. The Court attempts to brush the question [of efficiencies] aside by asserting
that Congress preferred competition to economies, but neglects to determine
whether certain economies are inherent in the idea of competition. If it is con-
ceded, as it must be, that Congress has reasons for favoring competition, then
more efficient operation must have been among them. It is of course true that a
firm's ability to achieve economies enhances its competitive position, but adverse
effect on competitors must be distinguished from adverse effects on competition.
386 U.S. at 597 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan concurred in the result because he
agreed with the Commission that the efficiencies in question were not beneficial. Id. at
603-04.
138. This is not to argue that the Court could not have reached out to decide the issue if
it chose to do so. It would be much easier, however, to read the quoted passage as preclud-
ing an efficiency defense if the parties had explicitly presented that issue. Since the parties
did not, and since the passage is obscure and subject to varying interpretations, the opinion
should not be read to bar an efficiency justification.
139. 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
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deal in the market, counted for the transaction in the antitrust
calculus.1 40 Although not brought under section 7, Tampa is rele-
vant because requirements contracts are a form of vertical integra-
tion similar in effect to vertical mergers. 141
2. Ford Motor Co. v. United States
142
The government successfully challenged Ford's acquisition of
Electric Autolite Company, as an independent manufacturer of
spark plugs and other automotive parts. After agreeing with the
district court that the merger was anticompetitive, the Court noted
that "It is argued, however, that the acquisition has some benefi-
cial effect in making Autolite a more vigorous and effective com-
petitor. . . than Autolite had been as an independent. But what
we said in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank. . .dis-
poses of the argument."'
' 43
Although this passage in Ford has been read as extending Phil-
adelphia National Bank from precluding justifications not related
to competition to precluding the economic justification of effi-
ciency,"4 the context does not compel such a conclusion. Ford's
argument was not based upon lower costs, but instead principally
upon Autolite's market share increase after the merger, while that
of its major competitor decreased.145 Indeed, Autolite's increase
could be attributed to Autolite providing spark plugs to its new
owner, Ford, rather than to the smaller Chrysler as it had before
the merger. Thus, the increase could be attributed to what the
Court felt were the anticompetitive aspects of the merger, namely,
foreclosure of Autolite from Ford's competitors.
46
140. Id. at 331-32. Professor Sullivan also suggests that Tampa supports an efficiency
defense. L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 631 (1978).
It should be noted that in the Standard Stations case, the Court found a requirements
contract to be illegal despite mentioning its advantages. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United
States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). The Court seemed to feel that section 3 prohibited considera-
tion of these efficiencies. The Tampa Court distinguished Standard Stations without com-
menting on the earlier decisions' treatment of efficiency.
141. Tampa could have integrated via merger with Nashville and obtained the same
result as the contract integration: the guaranty of a long-term supply of coal.
142. 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
143. Id. at 569-70. The Court then quoted the passage accompanying note Ill supra.
144. Pitofsky, supra note 42, at 1068.
145. Brief for Petitioner at 26. Although not one of its principal arguments, Ford did
argue that the merger increased efficiency because Ford had an extensive program for qual-
ity control (on which Ford spent $4.5 million annually) that other owners were not likely to
duplicate. Id. at 52.
146. Justice Stewart argued this position in concurrence, as did the government in its
brief. 405 U.S. at 580 n.3 (Stewart, J., concurring); Brief for Respondent at 38. On the
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3. More Recent Cases
Since 1974, the Court has become more receptive to economic
analysis. In merger cases, the Court has looked more closely at
economic evidence to determine competitive effect.' 47 Although
this approach has yet to include evidence of efficiency, such evi-
dence is consistent with the Court's recent approach. Further, the
Court has declined to follow the anticompetitive implications of
Brown Shoe. In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,48
the lower courts found liability in a private section 7 action based
upon entrenchment. 49 Although the viability of the entrench-
ment doctrine was not at issue, the Supreme Court condemned the
theory that a party could receive damages solely because its antici-
pated market share increase failed to materialize when a merger
kept a competitor in business. The Court cited Brown Shoe for
the proposition that competition, not competitors, was to be pro-
tected, 50 thus ignoring that Brown Shoe might also be read to
support competitors at the expense of competition. 5 ' Finally, in
GTE Sylvania,'52 the Court overturned an earlier decision holding
vertical market division to be per se illegal, and not only vigor-
ously applied economic analysis, but also insisted that antitrust
doctrine be grounded upon such analysis.
153
basis of this argument, Ford is not necessarily an extension of the Philadelphia Natl Bank
rationale.
147. See, e.g., United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974) (horizon-
tal merger); United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974) (conglomer-
ate merger).
A recent Note argues that an efficiency defense is inconsistent with GeneralDynamics,
where the Court allowed economic evidence to be used to rebut the presumption that the
market shares involved revealed the merger's anticompetitive nature. The Note bases this
argument on the assertion that the defense "is not an attack on the . . . [use of the market
shares] as inaccurately describing the impact of the merger, rather, it seeks to justify that
impact." Note, Horizontal Mergers 4fter United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 92
HARV. L. REv. 491, 508 (1978). On the contrary, the defense, by demonstrating that the
merger's net impact is procompetitive, does rebut the inference drawn from market shares.
148. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
149. The Court of Appeals opinion contains the best statement of the entrenchment
theory and its application to the particular facts. NBO Industries Treadway Cos. v. Bruns-
wick Corp., 523 F.2d 262, 268-70 (3d Cir. 1975).
150. The citation was to page 320 of the Brown Shoe opinion, not to page 344 which,
although also stating that competition is to be protected, contains the ambivalence earlier
discussed. See notes 97-106 supra and accompanying text.
151. The argument is not that Brunswick somehow overruled Brown Shoe, but merely
that Brown Shoe could have been read to support a damage award. As argued in Section
IIIA, however, Brown Shoe does not compel such a reading.
152. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
153. Two other cases are worthy of mention. Citizen Pub. Co. v. United States, 394
U.S. 131 (1969), involved ajoint venture between the only two daily newspapers in Tucson,
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E. Summary
Only a reading of the Court's decisions that ignores their con-
texts could lead one to conclude that an efficiency defense is pre-
cluded. Within the context of the relevant decisions the worst that
can be said for an efficiency justification is that it is precluded in
entrenchment cases when efficiency is the source of the harm
feared under that doctrine. This conclusion is not surprising since
the most striking feature demonstrated is that no case before the
Supreme Court has directly raised an efficiency justification.
There simply has yet to be a definitive decision.
IV. THE EFFICIENCY JUSTIFICATION AND THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS
Several commentators contend that because efficiency is an
"intractable subject for litigation", it should be precluded as a jus-
tification for merger.154 To evaluate this argument, this section
first considers the nature of efficiency. The analysis next explores
how different types of efficiency arguments might be presented in
a trial. Finally, the discussion frames this argument against an
Arizona, to manage all facets of the business, except news and editorials. Thus, the case
presented the opportunity to raise the arguments that Senators Kefauver and O'Conor had
presented on the floor of the Senate. See notes 78-79 supra and accompanying text. Al-
though the possibility for economies appears to exist and although the district court found
that the joint venture "had resulted in substantial cost savings," United States v. Citizen
Pub. Co., 280 F. Supp. 978, 982 (D. Ariz. 1968), the defendant did not raise this issue
before the Supreme Court. The National Association of Newspapers, however, mentioned
economies of scale. Amicus Brief of Nat'l Ass'n of Newspapers at 29-30. In striking down
the merger, the Court did not bother with the economic justification; instead, it discussed
only the failing business defense and the first amendment of the Constitution. All other
arguments were "too trivial for discussion." 394 U.S. at 140. Although Justice Stewart
dissented and Justice Harlan concurred in the result, both opinions concerned the failing
company defense, not efficiency. d. at 140 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 143 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
The second case, United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964), involved
the merger of a company involved primarily in the production of metal containers with
another company specializing in the manufacture of glass containers. Although the de-
fendant did not maintain that the merger created efficiencies benefiting consumers, it did
argue that diversification had "competitive" advantages. Id. at 463-64. The Court, appar-
ently agreeing that there were advantages, nevertheless found against the merger because
of anticompetitive effects, without stating or implying whether its rejection of the advan-
tages went to an efficiency justification.
154. R. BORK, supra note 6, at 123-29, 192-95; R. POSNER, supra note 6, at 111-12.
Among economists in favor of considering efficiency, the best known is Joe S. Bain. J.
BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 658 (2d ed. 1968); Bain, Discussion, 40 AM. EcON. REV.
64-66 (Papers & Proceedings 1950).
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efficiency defense in the context of the broader issue of how anti-
trust rules should be formulated.
A. The Nature of Efficiency
In merger litigation, an increase in efficiency should be defined
as a decrease in costs.155 Efficiency results when the same product
is produced at a lower cost or the merger allows a superior prod-
uct to be produced at the previous cost (thus effectively lowering
cost). This definition may be too narrow for purposes other than
merger litigation. For example, in evaluating which of two manu-
facturers of soft drinks provided more benefits to consumers, se-
lecting the one that produced at the lowest cost would not
necessarily be correct if the other company produced a product for
which consumers were willing to pay a higher price. 156
It is unlikely, however, that courts can define efficiency in
merger cases based on consumer satisfaction. Judges would rarely
have enough postacquisition evidence to determine whether the
judgment of the market indicated an increase in consumer wel-
fare, and would, in any event, have trouble distinguishing effi-
ciency from monopoly explanations of success. Because efficiency
based on consumer satisfaction is excluded, Professor Bork has
argued that an efficiency justification is unwarranted. "The real
objection to . . .efficiency defenses in antitrust law is that they
are spurious. They cannot measure the factors relevant to con-
sumer welfare, so that after the economic extravaganza was com-
pleted we would know no more than before it began." 157  In
mergers, however, efficiency evidence would improve decision-
making. As already demonstrated, if the evidence reveals that the
merger will result in nontrivial economies, the merger will usually
be procompetitive, justifying a merger that could otherwise be
155. Courts should distinguish pecuniary from real cost savings. Pecuniary economies,
such as cost savings from tax advantages, merely transfer wealth without reducing the re-
sources spent to produce the product in question. See generally P. STEINER, MERGERS
47-127 (1975). Even here, however, pecuniary and real cost savings may be linked, as
Frank Easterbrook has pointed out to me. Acquisition of an unprofitable firm confers tax
advantages, but if the now displaced management caused the poor performance, efficiency
could also increase.
156. This, of course, assumes that both companies are viable, le., able to receive a price
sufficient to generate at least a competitive rate of return. For more detailed discussions of
this type of efficiency, see R. BORK, supra note 6, at 104-06; McGee, Efficiency and Econo-
mies of Size in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING, supra note 116, at
88-89.
157. R. BORK, supra note 6, at 124.
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condemned. 15 8 Merely because some efficiencies are beyond fac-
ile demonstration does not justify preclusion of an efficiency de-
fense.
Among mergers that lower costs, it is useful to distinguish
technical from nontechnical efficiencies. Technical processes such
as economies of scale, whereby a firm with larger planned volume
reduces unit costs, are an important source of lower costs. As
Professor McGee has argued, however, exclusive focus on "techni-
cal processes. . . leaves out much of the real problem [in measur-
ing efficiency]: recruitment, evaluation, and promotion; product
design; research; planning; administration; cost and quality con-
trol; financing; marketing; and so on."' 59 Further, some individu-
als, some teams, some factors of production, and some firms are
simply more competent than others.
An important nontechnical efficiency involves transaction
costs, a good example of which is found in vertical mergers. Ver-
tical integration can reduce cost by facilitating technological inter-
dependence, such as when a steel furnace and rolling mill are
combined to limit the need for separate reheating. 6 ' Efficiency,
however, goes beyond such interdependence and involves what
Professor Coase has called "the supersession of the price mecha-
nism."16' Where the costs of a buyer and seller transacting
through the market are higher than those of one who performs the
same function within a single entity, integration will be preferred.
A vertical merger for this purpose thus increases efficiency.
162
There are other nontechnical efficiencies. For example, size
permits risk-pooling to lower the cost of raising capital. The aver-
age capital advantage of a one billion dollar firm over a ten mil-
158. See notes 14-41 supra and accompanying text.
159. McGee, supra note 156, at 69. On the nature of the efficiency of a "team" of
employees or managers, see Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Eco-
nomic Organization, 62 AM. EcON. REV. 777 (1972).
160. F. SCHERER, supra note 33, at 70.
161. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, reprinted in READINGS IN PRICE THEORY 331, 334
(G. Stigler & K. Boulding eds. 1952). Professor Williamson contends that transaction cost
efficiencies are more important than technical efficiencies in mergers, particularly in con-
glomerate and vertical mergers. Williamson III, supra note 18, at 723-24.
162. Coase, supra note 161, at 336. Conglomerate mergers can also provide transaction
economies. For example, conglomerates with a central office acting as a broker for internal
competition for funds may be able to allocate capital at less cost than the capital market,
due to savings such as lower costs from negotiating the transfer of funds. Further, since
division managers who receive the capital are insiders, they may be more cooperative with
the central office than with outsiders, thus providing the central office (which rations the
funds) with better sources of information. See 0. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERAR-
CHY: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 141-48 (1975).
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lion dollar firm is nearly one percentage point. 163  Another
nontechnical efficiency involves replacing an incumbent manage-
ment team with a more competent one. For publicly owned com-
panies, takeovers can produce such change in management.
Managers who do not perform well will see the price of their com-
pany's stock decline, inducing others to acquire the low-priced
stock and to change management to improve the company's per-
formance. 164
Technical efficiencies often hold the attention of courts and
commentators to the exclusion of nontechnical efficiencies. 165
This mistake must not be repeated with mergers. Although tech-
nical efficiencies will often be easier to demonstrate than nontech-
nical efficiencies, this difficulty should not preclude an efficiency
justification. Such an argument for preclusion is analogous to that
made by Professor Bork regarding efficiencies based on consumer
satisfaction and should be rejected for the same reason. The per-
fect should not be the enemy of the good. Whether the "good" is
sufficient, however, depends on whether defendants can satisfacto-
rily demonstrate any efficiencies at trial.
B. Applying the Efficiency Justocation
Although an efficiency justification might seem to require
163. Scherer, Economies of Scale and Industrial Concentration, in INDUSTRIAL CON-
CENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING, supra note 116, at 42 (summarizing studies using
1960's market conditions). Some of the advantages of size are discussed in note 162 supra.
164. See Manne, supra note 77. Of course, the market for control is not the only, or
even necessarily the most important, forum for disciplining managers. For example, the
direct market for managerial talent serves an important role in stimulating managers to
maximize profits. See Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, J. POL. ECON.
(manuscript in preparation).
165. See, e.g., In re Great Lakes Carbon Corp., 82 F.T.C. 1529 (1973); P. AREEDA & D.
TURNER, supra note 31, 408; Scherer, supra note 163. Scherer's work is particularly in-
structive since it represents a major effort to determine whether efficiency explains the ex-
tent of concentration in twelve industries. Although Scherer attempted to incorporate
transaction costs such as transportation cost and to calculate multiplant economies, he ig-
nored managerial efficiencies and he seemed to equate plant economies with firm econo-
mies. See McGee, supra note 156, at 103. See also the comment of Professor Schwartz,
Dialogue in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING, supra note 116, at 106.
An additional problem with these studies is the weakness of the data involved. See
generally the exchange between B. Bock and L. Weiss in BUSINESS DISCLOSURE: GOVERN-
MENT'S NEED TO KNOW 264--307 (H. Goldschmid, ed. 1979). Further, besides failing to
measure all that is relevant in lowering costs, they can ignore relevant variables that raise
costs, such as diseconomies of scale in management. Since it is equally possible that the
missing variables lower or raise costs, where an engineering study shows that certain costs
drop, the government should have the burden of persuasion that relevant cost increases are
ignored. On the nature of the trial, see notes 166-87 infra and accompanying text.
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courts to compare costs and benefits,' 66 it has already been shown
that a court need not normally measure the costs of the merger
(Le., the extent of increased market power).' 67 Instead, if the de-
fendant can show the existence of nontrivial economies-that is in
the magnitude of only one to two percent-the merger should be
presumed to be procompetitive.168
How can the defendant show the existence of nontrivial econo-
mies? One method would be to show the magnitude of the cost-
savings through engineering or statistical studies. 169 Engineering
studies typically involve economists analyzing data from engi-
neers (who often compile the relevant data on their own) to esti-
mate the costs of facilities of different sizes. Statistical studies
assemble data on costs, outputs, and other relevant characteristics,
and then use statistical techniques to estimate the cost-scale rela-
tionship. These studies have measured certain forms of efficien-
cies. 70
As an example of demonstrating efficiency, consider the brew-
ing industry. From 1947 to 1976, the number of plants in the in-
dustry decreased from 465 to 94, and the number of firms from
404 to 49. From the late 1950's to the early 1970's the Justice De-
partment attacked almost every brewing merger between local, re-
gional, or national firms that involved companies with significant
market shares.' 7' The potential for efficiencies appeared substan-
tial, particularly in mergers not involving the top few firms in the
industry. Compared to these few large firms which had built new
plants, other firms used outdated breweries or operated at less
than full capacity or both. Mergers would have enabled the con-
solidation of several brands into fewer plants, permitting longer
product runs, thereby reducing unit costs by spreading set-up costs
over a larger volume.172 Further, the volume increase would have
166. R. BORK, supra note 6, at 125; R. POSNER, supra note 6, at 112.
167. See notes 14-41 supra and accompanying text.
168. Id But see note 188 infra and accompanying text.
169. Scherer, supra note 163, at 18-19.
170. For a leading study, see Scherer, supra note 163.
171. Scherer, supra note 163, at 64-74. Many of the mergers involved firms which were
not industry leaders and would have had, even after the merger, market shares smaller
than the larger firms in the relevant markets. The leading cases include United States v.
Falstaff Brewing Co., 410 U.S. 526 (1973); United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S.
546 (1966);United States v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal.), affd
per curiam, 385 U.S. 37 (1966). By the mid-1970's, the Justice Department ceased bringing
such actions, perhaps because of the efficiencies discussed in the text.
172. For the seminal treatment of this form of efficiency, see Alchian, Costs and Out-
puts, in THE ALLOCATION OF ECONOMIC REsOuRCEs 23 (M. Abramovitz, et al. eds. 1959).
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facilitated both the modernization and expansion of the plants,
again lowering unit costs. Finally, excess capacity and redundant
management and distribution would have been eliminated. 73
Of course, these advantages could eventually have been real-
ized without mergers. It is conceivable that the small firms would
have gone bankrupt if they could not have merged, thus produc-
ing the same advantages in roughly the same time as mergers.
Even in this extreme case, there is no competitive reason to pre-
vent the merger (assuming that the costs of merging do not exceed
those of bankruptcy). Indeed, the merger would probably qualify
under the failing company doctrine. 74 Moreover, at least some
disadvantaged firms are likely to merge before their condition is
precarious enough to dictate bankruptcy, making merger a faster
route to lower costs.
The magnitude of some of the cost-savings in the brewing in-
dustry have been measured.17 One problem that plagued brew-
ing-shipments from less than optimal size plants-is a significant
problem in American manufacturing industries, since such ship-
ments are now approaching fifty percent. 76  More important,
For an excellent application to a specific industry, see McGee, Economies ofSize in Auto
Body Manufacture, 16 J. L. & ECON. 239 (1973).
173. Keithahn, The Brewing Industry (FTC Staff Report 1978).
174. See notes 74-77 supra and accompanying text.
175. Scherer estimated that a plant one-third of the minimal scale had costs five percent
more than a plant of optimal scale. Id. at 21. See generally Keithahn, supra note 173; D.
Norman, Structural Change and Performance in the U.S. Brewing Industry (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, UCLA, 1975).
Courts do have some experience with engineering studies. Under the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1976), utilities have used engineering stud-
ies of cost savings to justify integrated public utility holding companies. The Act limits a
company to a single integrated system unless an additional system, inter alia, "cannot be
operated as an independent system without the loss of substantial economies which can be
secured by the retention of control by such holding company .... " Id. § 79K(b)(1)(A).
Under this provision, utilities have occasionally demonstrated nontrivial cost savings (ie.,
at least one percent). Although such proof provides some support that the efficiency de-
fense is suitable for litigation, the evidence must be viewed skeptically. Even when the
Securities and Exchange Commission, which had initial jurisdiction under the Act, was
willing to concede the existence of nontrivial economies, this concession could be viewed as
gratuitous since the Commission interpreted the Act as requiring economies far greater
than nontrivial. Further, when the cost savings estimate was larger (e.g., greater than five
percent of expenses), the SEC usually concluded that the estimates were overstated. Thus,
to a considerable extent, the SEC experience is irrelevant for the purposes of this analysis.
For an exhaustive study of this economies defense, see R. RITCHIE, INTEGRATION OF PUB-
LIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANIES 135-91 (1954). See also Brodley, Industrial Concentra-
tion and Legal Feasibility: The Efficiencies Defense, 9 J. ECON. IssuEs 365, 368-70 (1975).
176. For a summary of this evidence, see Weiss, The Structure-Conduct Performance
Paradgn Antitrust Considerations, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1104, 1115-19 (1979).
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economists have found a systematic tendency for the percentage
of suboptimal shipments to decrease as concentration increases. 177
In other words, firms with larger market shares can use optimally-
sized plants, product runs, and output. This evidence indicates
that there are potential efficiency gains from mergers, with the
beer industry as only one example. Ignoring efficiency in these
horizontal mergers is anticompetitive. 78
Statistical and engineering studies are, however, ill-suited to
measure many nontechnical efficiencies and may, at times, fail
even to quantify technical ones. It will be more difficult to de-
velop even a good estimate of the cost savings from at least some
types of nontechnical efficiency and there will be technical effi-
ciencies where reliable estimates of magnitude are difficult to ob-
tain. Discussing efficiency within litigation will still be relevant if
a defendant shows that the merger will probably result in non-
trivial economies, even when it cannot show their precise magni-
tude. To explore this point, it will be helpful to divide the proof of
efficiency into two components: existence and magnitude. Merely
showing the existence of the efficiency may constitute sufficient
justification. If the defendant shows that the merger will increase
efficiency and if the cost savings can be projected over a substan-
tial part of the production process, the merger may then be justi-
177. For example, Professor Scherer's study found that a I% increase in concentration
led to a .95% reduction in shipments from suboptimal plants. See Scherer, The Determi-
nants ofIndustry Plant Size in Six Nations, 55 REV. ECON. & STAT. 135 (1973). Scherer
hypothesizes that one reason why this phenomenon exists involves the importance of sig-
nificant transportation costs, forcing firms with small shares to operate from smaller plants
since the small share limits the amount that can be sold close to the plant and transport
costs limit sales elsewhere. Id. This disadvantage makes the position of these small firms
insecure, unless they have other advantages, such as a product with special appeal to cer-
tain consumers. Although such advantages, in a rigorous market definition, would lead to
their separation from other firms, it is extremely unlikely that antitrust courts fine-tune
market definition to this extent. In any event, mergers could alleviate the disadvantages
discussed in the text, whether or not there are compensating advantages.
178. This evidence had led Professor Weiss to change his mind and conclude that hori-
zontal merger policy has been too harsh. Weiss, supra note 176, at 1117-18.
This evidence points to one significant source of efficiency from horizontal mergers.
Managerial acumen is another potentially significant source of efficiency. Regarding verti-
cal mergers, there is considerable evidence suggesting that these mergers often lead to effi-
ciencies. See, e.g., note 161 supra;, F. SCHERER, supra note 33, at 70. Only in conglomerate
mergers does there appear substantial disagreement about whether efficiency even occa-
sionally results. Compare, e.g., note 162 supra and Steiner, supra note 155, at 60-69,
196-200 (conglomerate mergers can be efficient) with 915 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. RaP.
(BNA) A-9 (May 24, 1979) and Mueller, The Effects of Conglomerate Mergers, A Survey of
the Empirical Evidence, I J. BANK. & FIN. 315 (1977) (conglomerate mergers generate neg-
ligible efficiencies).
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fled, particularly where proof of possible market power is weak.
Moreover, this approach is perfectly consistent with the Clayton
Act, which is concerned with probabilities, not certainties. 79
As to proving the existence of efficiency, a defendant as in the
brewing example could use two methods to infer lower costs
where reliable estimates of magnitude are unavailable. First, a
defendant could use a generally accepted economic or engineering
theory concerning the capacity of mergers to increase efficiency,
followed by evidence that the necessary steps would be, were be-
ing, or had been taken to implement such efficiency. For example,
the defendant might argue that reducing excess capacity would
lower cost through better plant utilization and elimination of ex-
cess capacity. A second method of showing the existence of effi-
ciency involves determining how market share is distributed
among the firms in the industry. For example, two companies
may merge where firms similar to their premerger size had been
losing market share to larger firms. This fact implies efficiency
from the merger particularly if firms the size of the new firm have
been growing.'8 0 Although a court might not want to rely exclu-
sively on such evidence, it would nonetheless provide additional
grounds for finding nontrivial economies where a reliable magni-
tude estimate is unavailable.
To understand the demonstration of nontechnical economies,
consider the example of the automobile industry. Once a manu-
facturer has entered into a contract with an independent owner of
dies for parts, the manufacturer desires ready access to the giant
presses used to stamp body parts if it faces a higher cost (e.g., from
delay) in obtaining alternative supplies of specific body parts. Be-
cause of the automaker's dependency, die owners have an incen-
tive to engage in opportunistic behavior to increase the contract
price to the higher price that the manufacturer would have to pay
its next best supplier. Opportunistic behavior may involve steps
such as delay by overt or implied threats and lack of coopera-
tion.' 81
In 1926, General Motors acquired Fisher Body. Before the
179. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble, 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967).
180. This technique is known as "survivorship" and traces its origin to Alchian, Uncer-
tainty, Evolution and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 211 (1950) and to Stigler, The
Economies ofScale, 1 J. L. & ECON. 54 (1958). For a discussion of this technique, particu-
larly its uses and limits, see McGee, supra note 156, at 80-83.
181. The best statement of this theory and its application to the merger discussed here
is Klein, Crawford & Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents and the Competitive
Contracting Process, 21 J. L. & ECON. 297, 308-310 (1978).
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merger, Fisher had tried to obtain higher prices from GM and
also refused to locate its body plants adjacent to GM's assembly
plants. Although GM claimed that relocation would lower costs,
moving the body plants required a large investment from Fisher
that would have made it vulnerable to future opportunistic behav-
ior from GM. 82 The merger thus arguably reduced the costs of
haggling, lowered the risk to GM, and perhaps most importantly,
it guaranteed the adjacent location of the body plant to the motor
assembly plant, thereby lowering costs. If General Motors could
have demonstrated its problems with Fisher and the cost-savings
potential in adjacent locations, existence of efficiency would have
been shown. Whether the savings were nontrivial depended upon
whether they applied to a significant part of the production proc-
ess, which, assuming that the costs of stamping and assembling
were a large part of the costs of production, appears to be the case.
A reliable estimate of the magnitude of cost savings would thus
have been unnecessary. 18
3
None of this is meant to deny the fact that the efficiency de-
fense will complicate trials. Some efficiencies will not be suffi-
ciently demonstrable, and some proceedings will devolve into a
mass of conflicting, confusing testimony. 84 Three factors, how-
182. Opportunism is possible because once the plants were adjacent, Fisher would find
it more costly to deal with anyone but GM. Although the possibility for opportunistic
behavior can work both ways, the General Motors-Fisher contract prohibited GM from
dealing elsewhere, limiting the opportunity for General Motors to gain from opportunism.
Apparently contract clauses as easily drafted and enforced did not exist to protect General
Motors, and the parties' attempt to draft a complicated formula for Fisher's compensation
did not work well in protecting GM.
Three other points are noteworthy. First, the problem was not monopoly. Even if GM
had several options as attractive as Fisher before the contract was signed, once the parties
began to work together, the arrangement assumed such a specialized posture that GM
would have had to pay a premium if it suddenly had to purchase elsewhere. Second, verti-
cal integration would not solve the opportunism problem if the specific asset that engen-
dered the problem was human capital since companies cannot fully integrate into the labor
of others. Third, on the assumption that spark plugs seem to be easily standardizable
among different cars, the Ford-Autolite merger cannot be explained on this ground. See
notes 142-46 supra and accompanying text. Klein, Crawford & Alchian, supra note 181, at
308.
183. Whether the efficiencies justify the merger depends upon whether the court thinks
that the competitive harm will be in the normal range that Williamson discusses. See notes
18-24 supra and accompanying text. If not, then a closer inquiry into market power would
be necessary. See note 188 infra and accompanying text. Further, even if a court had
considered internal growth relevant, this possibility would have been unlikely to change
the conclusion reached in the text. Forcing internal growth could have limited GM and
Fisher in utilizing the common experience and familiarity that they had gained.
184. One proposed measurement technique that appears faulty is suggested in Mantell,
Conglomerate Mergers, Alocative Efficiency, and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 56 TEx. L.
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ever, will ameliorate this problem. First, postacquisition evidence
may be available. Between the merger and the trial, the new firm
may have implemented some of the efficiencies. Evidence of im-
plementation will reduce uncertainty about the existence of lower
costs.185 Second, allowing a defense creates incentives to develop
improved methods of demonstrating efficiency. It is unreasonable
to assume that the current ability of economists to demonstrate
efficiency will not improve.' 86 Finally, when judges have diffi-
culty in evaluating confficting evidence, the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence 187 permit appointment of an independent expert to assist
REV. 207 (1978). There are two problems with the model that he suggests for measuring
efficiency in merger cases. First, although the author states that he is not "invariably"
using profitability as a measure of market power, in applying his model to condemn
Procter & Gamble's acquisition of Clorox, id. at 233 n.70, he relies on increased profits as a
measure of such power. Superiority, rather than market power, may just as easily have
caused the increase in profits. On the difficulties of using profitability to measure market
power, see generally Demsetz, Two Systems of Beief About Monopoly in INDUSTRIAL CON-
CENTRATION: THE NEw LEARNING, supra note 116, at 164. Second, his model appears to
contain a theoretical flaw. In developing his model, he uses a merger that lowers cost as
well as increases market power and a merger that only increases market power. In analyz-
ing gains and losses of the former merger, he appears not to include the benefits of the extra
units produced (relative to the merger that only increased market power) because of lower
costs. If these units are not counted, the benefits of a merger that both increases market
power and reduces costs are understated.
185. Since section 7 requires only a probability that the merger is harmful and that
probability need not manifest itself before the trial and since firms could temporarily re-
frain from anticompetitive acts, the Court has criticized heavy reliance on postacquisition
evidence to determine whether a merger would have an anticompetitive effect. See, e.g.,
FTC v. Procter & Gamble, 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967); FTC v. Consolidated Foods, 380 U.S.
592, 598 (1965). Thus, postacquisition evidence can be irrelevant when it reveals no harm-
ful effect. When determining if the merger has the procompetitive effect of efficiency, how-
ever, postacquisition evidence can demonstrate the existence of this benefit, and firms
would have no reason to undo cost saving measures once litigation ended. Recently the
Court approved use of postacquisition evidence where one could draw a more permanent
inference from it than that feared in P & G and Consolidated Foods. See United States v.
General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 504-06 (1974) (postacquisition evidence of lack of
coal reserves showed acquired company unable to compete effectively).
Under the recently enacted premerger notification provisions, Clayton Act § 7A, 15
U.S.C. § 18a, the government can more easily attack mergers at earlier stages than before
and hence the amount of postacquisition evidence available will probably decrease.
186. See Williamson II, supra note 18, at 113.
187. See FED. R. OF EVID., 706. The expert's findings are given to both parties and are
subject to cross-examination. A further step to help judges has been education in econom-
ics and in statistical techniques. See Guzzardi, Judges Discover the World of Economis,
FORTUNE, May 21, 1979, at 58.
The lesson of this part of the paper can be summarized in an economic analysis of the
judicial system. The economic goal of that system is to minimize the sum of the direct costs
of the system and the costs of making errors. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal
Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 399 (1973). See also Ehrlich &
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEG. STUD. 257 (1974). Direct
1980]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
the judge.
A further complication is that the presumption that nontrivial
economics outweigh any market power can be rebutted. The two
most likely grounds for rebuttal, however, will probably be infre-
quent. Large price increases would appear to result only from the
now extinct (and previously rare) mergers to monopoly and merg-
ers that create a dominant firm. Further, internal growth will be
crucial only when demand is growing, the potential market power
increase is high, and entry from outside of the industry will be
slow in coming. Given the impossibility of an explicit tradeoff,
when the presumption is rebutted, courts will have to rely on more
rigorous proof of efficiency before approving the merger. When it
is possible to measure the magnitude of cost-savings, the court
could engage in a rough balancing; if not, the merger would be
disapproved. Thus, for example, if cost-savings could be reliably
estimated at four percent, either the court would have to believe
that the merger would probably raise prices by twenty percent
(with elasticity of two) or that internal growth would far precede
other entry before invalidating the merger. 8  If such cost-savings
could not be reliably shown, the merger would be disapproved.
C. Economic Evidence and Antitrust Proceedings
Most of those opposing efficiency as a justification would have
legality turn on "simple" tests, particularly concentration. For ex-
ample, Professor Posner argues that, with an exception to be dis-
cussed below, horizontal mergers that increase four-form
concentration to above sixty percent should be prohibited. 8 9
Such rules simplify the trial, making the determination of compet-
itive effect turn on a single fact. Unfortunately, other relevant
facts that may influence competition, such as efficiency, are totally
ignored.
costs are those of the parties in litigation and of the public in providing the judicial forum.
Error costs derive from mistaken decisions and are the product of the probability of error
and the cost when an error occurs. Since a significant number of mergers lowers costs, see
notes 160-64, 175-78 supra and accompanying text, and since even a small reduction in
costs is likely to outweigh any increase in market power, see notes 14-41 supra and accom-
panying text, this article contends that failure to consider efficiency will significantly in-
crease error costs. Although direct costs will also increase, this part of the article has
argued that the efficiency issue can be litigated without that increase outweighing the re-
duction in error costs.
188. See Table 1 supra.
189. R. POSNER, supra note 6, at 111-12. For other largely market share tests, see R.
BORK, supra note 6, at 221-22, 269-78.
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Antitrust law has used two divergent methods to simplify tri-
als. The first is the rule of reason under which some practices
have come to be per se illegal. Trials involving naked horizontal
price fixing, for example, have been greatly simplified by the im-
plementation of aper se rule.190 The only issue is the existence of
the act; other evidence, such as an efficiency justification, is irrele-
vant. The decision to simplify price fixing trials has a firm eco-
nomic foundation, since naked horizontal price fixing cannot be
justified as reasonable; that is, it cannot be justified on economic
grounds. Because the only relevant economic issue is the exist-
ence of the practice, price fixing is per se illegal. Other practices
have been held to be similarly illegal, on the basis either that the
practice cannot be justified or that the circumstances under which
it can be justified are so rare that justification is not worth the
effort.
United States v. Topco Assoc. 9' illustrates the second, more
unusual, manner in which antitrust courts have simplified anti-
trust trials. There, the Court foundper se illegal a horizontal mar-
ket division which was arguably ancillary to an integration of
productive efforts. The Court refused to consider this justification,
apparently because the Court felt itself incapable of performing
the necessary economic analysis. 92 The decision to simplify the
antitrust trial was founded on judicial expediency, not economics.
As Chief Justice Burger argued in dissent' 93 and as the Court im-
plied in its 1977 GTE Sylvania decision, this ground for simplifica-
tion ignores the possibility that the practice might be justified
under traditional rule of reason analysis and hence is aberrant. 194
Upon which foundation do merger rules that ignore efficiency
lie? There are three bases that could bring them within the tradi-
tional rule of reason. First, economic theory might dictate that
efficiency should be ignored. This argument does not withstand
scrutiny of the costs and benefits possible from mergers. As illus-
trated earlier,195 even a large price increase can be offset by rela-
190. A naked horizontal price fix is one that is not accompanied by an integration of
productive facilities or efforts.
191. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
192. Id. at 609-10.
193. Id. at 613 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
194. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, n.16 (1978). See also
National Soe'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (reemphasizing
the importance of traditional rule of reason analysis). Of course, this is not to say that the
costs of judges and the parties are totally irrelevant. See note 185 supra.
195. See notes 14-41 supra and accompanying text.
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tively smaller increases in efficiency. Thus, economic theory does
not justify exclusion of efficiency, as, of course, some opponents of
the justification acknowledge. 196
Second, we could ignore efficiency if economicfact indicated
that mergers were not a source of efficiency. To rebut this argu-
ment, mergers need not normally lower costs nor do mergers need
to explain the cost patterns of most American industries. It is nec-
essary only that a nontrivial number of (litigated) mergers lower
costs. If mergers can reduce costs, then ignoring efficiency cannot
be justified as preventing search for a nonexistent benefit. Many
scholars contend, and evidence supports the conclusion, that
mergers are a source of lower costs.197 The consensus is strongest
regarding vertical mergers. To the extent that this consensus re-
flects reality, an efficiency defense would be the most useful in
vertical cases. Efficiency may occur less frequently in horizontal
mergers, but is still possible as in the example of the beer indus-
try.198 The debate over the efficiency potential of conglomerate
mergers is more heated, but most economists who are skeptical of
efficiency claims for conglomerates would permit an efficiency de-
fense in legislation designed to restrict conglomerate mergers.199
Judges will, of course, find it more difficult to develop appro-
priate antitrust rules in cases where economists disagree. The po-
tential for important disagreement makes it unlikely that courts
will, or even should, accept simple rules based upon one view.
Although litigation is an unlikely place to resolve theoretical dis-
putes among economists, when the economists are in agreement
about the relevant theory but disagree over the frequency of the
practice, as they do to a significant extent with the issues of market
power and efficiency, these factual differences are susceptible to
intelligent discussion within the context of a trial.
The third basis that could bring the concentration-only rule
within the rule of reason is that concentration rules might suffi-
ciently protect efficiency. This, however, is not the case. As al-
ready seen,2" if the merger does lower costs, it is likely to be
196. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 6, at 113; R. BORK, supra note 6, at 128.
197. See R. POSNER, supra note 6, at 111; R. BORK, supra note 6, at 128; Weiss, supra
note 176; Williamson II, supra note 18.
198. See notes 171-78 supra and accompanying text.
199. See note 178 supra and accompanying text.
As will be explained, see notes 205-210 infra and accompanying text, even if most
vertical or conglomerate mergers were not anticompetitive, there is an important practical
reason for allowing an efficiency defense.
200. See notes 14-41 supra and accompanying text.
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procompetitive even at high concentrations. On the other hand, if
the merger does not create efficiency, it may pose a danger of rais-
ing prices even at lower concentrations. 01
Thus, exclusion of efficiency is much more consistent with the
aberrant Topco analysis than with the more traditional approach.
To preclude efficiency because it would be complicated is arbi-
trary when many efficiencies can be shown in a trial.20 2 Exclusion
seems all the more arbitrary when one realizes that at least some
proponents of exclusion implicitly recognize that the merger trial
must be complex if it is to bear any relation to relevant economic
theory. For example, the market share rule encompasses only one
factor influencing the ability of firms to collude. Other factors,
notably ease of entry, are ignored, and a theoretically sound
merger rule would encompass these other factors.20 3 Further, a
necessary and often complex issue in using the concentration test
is defining the market--determining what appropriate substitutes
to include with the products of the merging firms. In short, if eco-
nomics is to have a prominent role in merger cases, the trial will of
necessity be complex, with or without an efficiency justification. 204
201. See R. POSNER, supra note 6, at 112.
202. See notes 166-87 supra and accompanying text.
203. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 6, at 112 (certain mergers in industries with a
four-firm concentration below 60% should be stopped where other factors facilitating collu-
sion are present). For a discussion of the many factors besides concentration that influence
the ability to collude, see id. at 39-77.
Since Professor Bork's rules would permit almost all mergers, they are less susceptible
to the claim that they do not protect efficiency than the rules of Professor Posner (although
Professor Posner is correct in stating that his rule would result in challenges to significantly
fewer mergers, and therefore would in this sense facilitate efficiency. Id. at 113). As a
"concession to current oligopoly phobia," Bork suggests that horizontal mergers should be
stopped when they leave less than three significant companies in the industry. R. BORK,
supra note 6, at 221-22. As opposed to Posner, Bork would not deem relevant the factors
that may facilitate collusion other than concentration. Thus, Bork's rule is vulnerable be-
cause it does not properly consider the harmful effects of mergers, particularly given the
incomplete knowledge of economists about collusion. Further, as Bork admits, some effi-
cient mergers may be prevented. Bork's rule may therefore stop a few efficient mergers,
while at the same time allowing mergers that foster collusion, but do not increase efficiency.
Beside the methods discussed in the text of simplification under the traditional rule of
reason, another method might be to simplify when the state of the economic art is such that
the issue cannot be discussed sensibly in the context of litigation, even though simplifica-
tion cannot be justified by the other methods. If this argument means that merger cases
must be "simple," it is a confession that economics cannot guide antitrust on the issue of
mergers. As argued in the text, even excluding efficiency, merger rules based upon eco-
nomic theory require "complex" trials.
204. Defining the market and determining whether the industry is collusion-prone can
be every bit as complex as determining efficiency. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra
note 31, at 346-88 (defining the market); R. POSNER, supra note 6, at 39-77 (determining
whether the industry is collusion-prone).
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Two other elements of the relationship of an efficiency defense
to the development of proper antitrust rules should be empha-
sized. In many areas of antitrust law, courts, particularly the
Supreme Court, have deemed certain facts relevant without ex-
pressing any cogent theory of why those facts are important.z 5
This has led to confusion and has given the decisions an ad hoc
cast. Since economic theory impels the relevance of efficiency,
utilization of the efficiency justification would represent the an-
tithesis of the ad hoc approach.
Second, there may be an important practical ground for an
efficiency justification. Antitrust courts and regulators are skepti-
cal of many business practices, often appearing to condemn them
based on no more than unfamiliarity.20 6 In merger cases, busi-
nesses have failed to justify their actions as contributing to effi-
ciency, and they have even explicitly denied that efficiency was a
reason for merging. Confronted with defendants who do not jus-
tify their practices and even with defendants like those in Brown
Shoe who say as little as possible about the purpose of the
merger,20 7 judges have perhaps found it easy to condemn mergers
out of hand. They may have thought that even if the evidence of
harm from the merger were insubstantial, the merger should
nonetheless be aborted if the defendant could not articulate its
benefits.2 8 An efficiency defense would forestall this judicial ten-
dency. Positive evidence of the benefits of mergers should allow
more procompetitive mergers to withstand antitrust scrutiny than
will negative arguments based solely upon the small likelihood of
anticompetitive effect. At the very least, the defense should re-
duce the use of efficiency against mergers.
Two recent examples where evidence of the benefits of the pro-
posed action helped cause changes in the law lend support to the
205. Both R. BORK, supra note 6, and R. POSNER, supra note 6, provide excellent dis-
cussions of this point.
206. Coase, Industrial Organization: A Proposalfor Research in Policy Issues and Re-
search Opportunities in INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 67 (V. Fuchs ed. 1972); Williamson,
Book Review, 83 YALE L.J. 647, 661 (1974).
207. See notes 87-95 supra and accompanying text.
208. Bork maintains that the defense will lead agencies to conclude that direct proof is
the only way to count efficiency. He states: "Economists, like other people, will measure
what is susceptible to measurement and will tend to forget what is not, though what is
forgotten may be far more important than what is measured." R. BORK, supra note 6, at
127. To the extent that Bork is correct, this arguesfor an efficiency justification. Given the
current attitudes ofjudges, they will "forget" what is not shown, thereby being harsher on
efficiency without the defense than they would be with it.
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practical importance of an efficiency justification in mergers. In
GTE Sylvania,2 °9 the Court overruled the Schwinn decision that
held, contrary to economic analysis, vertical territorial allocations
to be per se illegal.210 A strong case may be made that the intel-
lectual battle against Schwinn was successful, not because of argu-
ments and evidence that there is no harm from vertical territorial
allocation, but because of arguments and evidence that the prac-
tice can be beneficial. Another triumph of economic analysis is
the deregulation of commercial airlines. Demand for deregula-
tion may have grown, not because scholars showed that regulation
was contrary to our normal presumption in favor of markets, but
because they showed that deregulation would produce large bene-
fits to consumers.2 '
D. Summary
If merger law is to be based upon sound economic theory, effi-
ciency must be explicitly considered. Although an efficiency justi-
fication will somewhat complicate merger proceedings and
economies cannot always be demonstrated, the justification will
increase the number of beneficial mergers that withstand judicial
scrutiny. Further, antitrust jurisprudence and its relation to eco-
nomics would seem to require efficiency evidence.
V. CONCLUSION
When a court intervenes to prevent a merger that would have
resulted in even small economies, the effect is usually contrary to
the purpose of the antitrust laws since the procompetitive benefits
of efficiency will probably outweigh any anticompetitive effect.
Despite this, defendants in merger cases have rarely attempted to
justify their actions on the basis of efficiency; indeed, they have
occasionally denied that the merger enhanced efficiency.
This conduct of defendants is unwarranted. Economic theory
underscores the importance of efficiency. Further, neither Con-
gress nor the Court has precluded an efficiency justification. In
fact, evidence exists that Congress considered efficiency relevant
and to weigh in favor of the merger. Finally, although an effi-
209. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
210. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
211. Of course, other variables, which can be generally described as "political," under-
lie any change in government policy. To admit the existence of these variables does not
diminish the contention that ideas do occasionally matter.
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ciency justification will make merger proceedings more complex,
the issue is a suitable one for litigation. If economics is to guide
courts in merger decisions, litigation must be complex, with the
issue of efficiency an element of the trial.
